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1 
ADAPTING HUMAN RIGHTS 





Governmental leaders, scholars, and activists have advocated for 
human rights to food, water, education, health care, and energy.  Such 
rights, also called positive rights, place an affirmative duty upon the 
state to provide a minimum quantity and quality of these goods and 
services to all citizens.  But food, education, water, and health care are 
so different–in how they are produced, consumed, and financed–that 
the implementation of a positive right must be adapted to the distinctive 
characteristics of the good or service it guarantees. The primary aims of 
this adaptive implementation are transparency, enforceability and 
sustainability in the provision of positive rights. Only by adapting a 
positive right to its policy environment can such a right function as a 
viable means of protecting disadvantaged members of society. This 
article uses the example of positive rights to public utilities, such as 
water and energy, to illustrate adaptive implementation of positive 
rights. In doing so, this article explains why and how a positive right 
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By 2030, population growth, economic development, and global 
climate change will increase demand for food, water, and energy by 
fifty percent.1  In response to these pressures, and growing concerns 
for wealth inequities, many scholars, activists, and government 
officials have advocated for, or enacted, a human right to food, water, 
sanitation, and energy.2  These human rights are typically formulated 
as positive rights, an affirmative obligation of the state to provide a 
minimum quantity and quality of these goods and services to all 
citizens.3  The rationale behind a positive right is that it guarantees 
 
 1.  Patricia Wouters, Sergei Vinogradov & Bjørn-Oliver Magsig, Water Security, 
Hydrosolidarity, and International Law: A River Runs Through It, 19 YEARBOOK OF INT’L. 
ENVTL. L. 97, 98 (2008). 
 2.  See, e.g., United Nations, THE RIGHT TO WATER AND SANITATION IN NATIONAL 
LAW, http://www.righttowater.info/progress-so-far/national-legislation-on-the-right-to-water/ 
(ensuring a fundamental human right to water); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the 
Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363 (2010) (exploring the policy 
of adaptations to climate change and identifying trends in environmental law’s involvement in 
these adaptations); Stephen McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International 
Implications, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992) (inferring a right to water under basic 
international law); Stephen R. Tully, The Contribution of Human Rights to Universal Energy 
Access, 4 NW. UNIV. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 518 (2006) (asserting that the right to energy is a human 
right); Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable under International 
Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 691 (2006) (identifying the right to food as a basic human 
right). 
 3.  The distinction between negative and positive rights was notably developed in I. 
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the provision of goods and services essential to basic human welfare, 
in effect, advancing the achievement of an equitable and free society.4 
Public utilities provide these kinds of essential goods and services, 
including sanitation, water, and energy. But how such a right should 
be implemented depends on the unique characteristics of the goods or 
services the right guarantees. For example, applying a positive rights 
approach to public utilities can potentially be perversely counter-
productive.5 
Recent events in the City of Detroit provide an example of why a 
positive right connected to public utilities is problematic. In 2013, 
Detroit declared bankruptcy in the wake of mounting debt and 
declining revenues.6  The declining revenues were attributable in part 
to the difficult financial situations faced by many citizens of Detroit.7 
Both the city and its citizens were impacted in particular in water 
services, with many delinquent accounts costing the city millions of 
dollars.8 Detroit began shutting off water services to these delinquent 
accounts, resulting in city-wide protests.9 The city noted that cost 
recovery improved as consumers paid overdue bills or entered into a 
repayment program after being shut off.10 Nevertheless, the city 
ceased cutting off water services after the judge in Detroit’s 
 
BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118–34 (1969). See Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive 
Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001), for a critical evaluation of positive rights.  See Kenneth 
Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63–73 (2004), for a defense of this 
approach. 
 4.  Rhett B. Larson, The New Right in Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2194–2200 
(2013). See generally Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1758 (2008) [hereinafter New Right in Water] (arguing that human rights create efficiency and 
benefit overall human welfare). 
 5.  Id. at 2257–58; see also Rhett B. Larson, Reconciling Energy and Food Security, 48 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 929, 938–40 (2014) [hereinafter Reconciling Energy] (explaining that a human 
right to an exhaustible resource gives consumers no incentive to conserve that resource). 
 6.  David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Be An Option (For People, Places, or 
Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 2220 (2014). 
 7.  John Reeves, 19 Shocking Facts About Detroit’s Bankruptcy, USA TODAY (Dec. 3, 
2013), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/12/02/19-facts-
about-detroit-bankruptcy/3823355/. 
 8.  Detroit has 175,000 residential water accounts, with 80,000 accounts past due, owing a 
total of $43 million (an average of $540 per account). Matthew Dolan, Detroit’s Water Cutoffs 
Spark Protests, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2014), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/detroits-
water-cutoffs-spark-protests-1405714429. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Alisa Priddle & Matt Helms, Bankruptcy Judge Tells Detroit to Address Water 
Shutoffs, USA TODAY (July 16, 2014), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/ 
2014/07/16/detroit-bankruptcy-water/12734925/. 
Larson-Macro (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016  5:00 PM 
4 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXVI:1 
bankruptcy proceedings, as well as the United Nations, protestors, 
and commentators raised concerns that cutting off water violates a 
fundamental human right.11 Similar large protests erupted in late 2014 
in response to Ireland’s imposition of new water fees as part of its 
austerity program, with opponents arguing that the water fees violate 
human rights.12 
Does the protection of human rights mean that the City of 
Detroit is prohibited from cutting off consumers who do not pay their 
water bills, or that Detroit is required to provide a certain amount of 
drinking water for free, or far below cost? The design, development, 
construction, and maintenance of traditional water treatment and 
distribution systems are expensive, and the energy demands and costs 
for water treatment and transportation are high.13 How can an 
insolvent Detroit afford to provide free or cheap water without 
ultimately sacrificing the integrity of the system, the quality of the 
water, and the financial health of the city? 
The problem of higher consumption of cheap water is all the 
more difficult where water is scarce. The challenge of not recovering 
costs for supplying water faced by places like Detroit and Ireland is 
then aggravated by a low water supply–in that case, the city risks 
running out of money and also running out of water. For example, the 
City of San Bernardino, located in drought-stricken California, 
recently declared bankruptcy like Detroit.14 Around the same time, 
California’s “Human Right to Water Bill” came into effect.15 That bill 
recognizes that “every human being has the right to safe, clean, 
affordable, and accessible water.”16 Does such a right require free or 
 
 11.  Alana Semuels, Thousands Go Without Water as Detroit Cuts Service for Nonpayment, 
LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 28, 2014), available at http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-detroit-
water-20140629-story.html. 
 12.  Kate Galbraith, Ireland Sets Water Fees, Angering Thousands, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 
2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/business/international/ireland-sets-water-
fees-angering-thousands.html?_r=0. 
 13.  Amy Hardberger, Powering the Tap Dry: Regulatory Alternatives for the Energy-Water 
Nexus, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 529, 532 (2013). 
 14.  Robin Respaut, Hoping for Progress, San Bernardino Sets Bankruptcy Case Deadlines, 
REUTERS (July 10, 2014), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/10/usa-
municipality-sanbernardino-idUSL2N0PL01J20140710; Veronica Rocha, California Drought 
Will Only Get Worse, Experts Say, LOS ANGELES TIMES (July 19, 2014), available at 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-california-drought-worsen-20140718-story.html. 
 15.  Skylar Marshall, California Declares a Human Right to Water, UNIVERSITY OF 
DENVER WATER LAW REVIEW BLOG (June 10, 2013), http://duwaterlawreview.com/ca-human-
right-to-water/. 
 16.  CAL. WATER CODE § 106.3(a) (West 2012); see generally INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW CLINIC, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, SCHOOL OF L., THE HUMAN RIGHT TO 
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low-priced water, and if so, how much water and for whom? If 
consumers do not internalize the costs of consumption associated 
with a positive right to water, then they will have little incentive to 
conserve.17 How could San Bernardino meet the requirements of 
California’s human right to water without aggravating or prolonging 
both money and water scarcity? 
Similar problems also arise in the case of energy utilities. 
Consumers obtaining cheap energy via a positive right will have little 
incentive to conserve. Furthermore, the provider will have trouble 
recovering costs. Combined, cheap energy under a positive right will 
degrade infrastructure (making it less efficient) and aggravate 
greenhouse gas emissions contributing to climate change.18 
This article argues that the implementation of positive rights 
must be adapted to the unique policy environment in which such 
rights are implemented, so as to ensure that their provision is 
sustainable, transparent, and enforceable. These conditions are like 
air, light, and water to a living organism–without them, life cannot 
survive. And just as living organisms must adapt to their environment 
in order to thrive, so too must positive rights adapt to their unique 
policy environment. Just as birds adapt to life in mountains, islands, 
or deserts, so too must positive rights adapt to the different policy 
environments of health care, education, food, and water. To achieve 
the goals of transparency, enforceability, and sustainability, a positive 
right must be adapted to the unique characteristics of the good or 
service it guarantees. This Article uses the example of positive human 
rights to public utilities to illustrate the need for the adaptive 
implementation of such rights.19 
The characteristics of public utilities like water treatment and 
 
WATER BILL IN CALIFORNIA: AN IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK FOR STATE AGENCIES 
(May 2013), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ Water_Report_2013_Interactive 
_FINAL.pdf (affirming California’s recognition of water as a human right). 
 17.  Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515, 523 
(2007). 
 18.  Sarah Krakoff, Planetarian Identity Formation and the Relocalization of Environmental 
Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 87, 98 (2012). 
 19.  See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1237–38 (1982) (discussing adaptive implementation within the context of 
general regulatory theory instead of within a positive rights context); see also Alejandro 
Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 293, 297–98 (2007) (discussing the role of regulatory adaptive implementation in 
protecting endangered species); Jonathan Cannon, A Bargain for Clean Water, 17 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 608, 625 (2008) (explaining the use of regulatory adaptive implementation of water 
pollution measures). 
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distribution, wastewater collection and treatment, and the 
transmission of energy, create unique challenges to the 
implementation of positive rights.20 Public utilities have high initial 
capital requirements that effectively bar competitors from entering 
the market.21 This “natural monopoly” limits competition as a means 
for price control.22 Without market forces to suppress prices, 
government regulators typically set rates on public utilities to avoid 
monopolistic pricing.23 However, these rates must still be set high 
enough to recover the cost of service and provide a rate of return that 
will attract investment and the expertise necessary for public utilities 
management.24 Furthermore, the rates must be set high enough to 
encourage conservation.25 But a positive right to public utilities may 
drive rates too low, reducing necessary cost-recovery for providers 
and cost-internalization for consumers.26 Furthermore, courts 
adjudicating a positive right to public utilities may lack the 
institutional competence to deal with the highly technical questions 
associated with rate-setting and natural resource management.27 With 
these considerations in mind, the implementation of positive rights to 
 
 20.  See New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2188 (explaining that adopting formal water 
rights in India did not improve access to water); see also Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Human 
Right to Water, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 581 (2007) (“The problem of a human right 
to water, being a natural monopoly, raises more emotions that any other issue relating to 
economic, cultural, and social human right, such as housing and the eradication of 
poverty. . . .”). 
 21.  Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis 
of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1372 (1986). 
 22.  Id.; see also Michael K. Kellogg, John Thorne & Peter W. Huber, Telecommunications 
in Jericho, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1213–14 (1993) (characterizing telecommunications as a 
protected industry whose monopoly bars competitive prices). 
 23.  Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New Model for 
U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 81 (2007). 
 24.  Id.; see also Richard J. Pierce, Price Level Regulation Based on Inflation is Not an 
Attractive Alternative to Profit Level Regulation, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 665, 665–79 (1990). 
 25.  See David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy 
Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 136–37 (2012) (describing the 
common law rule of capture’s detrimental effect on conserving resources and on stabilizing 
prices). 
 26.  See generally Juliet B. Schor, Prices and Quantities: Unsustainable Consumption and 
the Global Economy, 55 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 309 (2005) (discussing the relationship 
between low prices and unsustainable consumption); see also Glenn Blackmon & Richard 
Zeckhauser, Fragile Commitments and the Regulatory Process, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 73, 90 (1992) 
(explaining that a low public utility cost creates inefficient cost recovery); see also David B. 
Spence, The Political Barriers to a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1451, 1454–55 (2010) 
(stating that energy regulation prioritizes low pricing rates). 
 27.  Jim Rossi, Moving Public Law Out of the Deference Trap in Regulated Industries, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617, 627 (2005). 
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food, education, or health care will require different adaptations, just 
as the policy environment of different positive rights will require 
different adaptations to achieve transparency, enforceability, and 
sustainability. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes positive 
rights and distinguishes them from negative rights, and explains how 
positive rights have been applied to public utilities. Part II explains 
how the characteristics of public utilities often make a positive rights 
approach unenforceable, inequitable, and/or unsustainable, and why 
they therefore require adaptive implementation. Part III proposes 
and evaluates three potential reforms that should be used to 
effectively adapt the implementation of a positive right to public 
utilities, and avoid or mitigate the problems associated with such 
rights. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF POSITIVE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 
People are rarely “against” sustainability, transparency, or 
human rights when they are considered separately or in the abstract. 
These elements should be the primary aims of any human right. 
However, when considered together, and in light of practical 
implementation, these elements can often form a combustible 
mixture. The viability of any positive right depends not only upon the 
policy arena in which the right will be applied, but also upon tailoring 
the implementation to that policy arena.28 The tailoring of regulation 
and judicial oversight to the characteristics of the good or service 
guaranteed by a positive right is known as an adaptive 
implementation. A positive right to education or food should not be 
treated the same as the human right to public utilities, but positive 
rights laws should be implemented to the unique characteristics of the 
good or service guaranteed by the state. 
This Part lays the foundation for understanding why the  
implementation of positive rights in public utilities often fail and how 
positive rights can be tailored to the public utilities arena by (A) 
explaining positive rights and distinguishing them from negative 
rights; (B) explaining public utilities and differentiating them from 
other policy arenas in which positive rights are implemented; and (C) 
 
 28.  See, e.g., Molly Land, Rebalancing TRIPS, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 433, 472 (2012) 
(arguing that human rights implicated by intellectual property law should be tailored to that 
particular policy arena). 
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explaining and evaluating how positive rights have been implemented 
in the public utilities context. 
A. Distinguishing Positive Rights from Negative Rights 
The term “right” is often applied to a policy aim without regard 
to its legal implications, simply being used as a moniker by policy 
entrepreneurs to indicate high importance.29 Additionally, this term 
has obvious rhetorical value in public policy debates and meaning 
within the literature on natural rights.30 For purposes of this article, 
however, a “right” is a legally established and enforceable obligation 
or restraint imposed on government and held by citizens, either 
individually or collectively.31 
Rights are often divided into two categories – positive rights and 
negative rights.32 The distinction is, superficially, intuitive and 
straightforward. Negative rights forbid the government from engaging 
in certain actions such as interfering with speech or discriminating on 
the basis of race.33 Positive rights require the government to engage in 
certain actions, as with the provision of health care or education.34 On 
closer examination, however, the distinction is problematic.35 For 
example, the enforcement and enjoyment of any negative right 
requires a minimum level of health, education, civic participation 
 
 29.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2198 (citing Daniel Bodansky, Climate Change 
and Human Rights: Unpacking the Issues, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 511, 514 (2010)). 
 30.  See generally LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953)[Source on order; 
not yet substantiated]; Phillip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American 
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993) (discussing natural rights in the context of constitutional 
law and natural rights). 
 31.  Cross, supra note 3, at 860. 
 32.  See generally Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1363 (1984) 
(discussing four contemporary critiques to the liberal theory of rights); see also Susan Bandes, 
The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990) (critiquing the notion that 
the Constitution ensures citizens only negative liberties); but see New Right in Water, supra note 
4 (arguing that rights could more accurately be divided into “provision rights” and 
“participation rights”). 
 33.  See, e.g., C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110 (1978) (analyzing individual rights within 
community morality); see also Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1911 (2001) (asserting that citizens’ individual constitutional rights  in 
liberal democracies should ensure their government commitment to fundamental human 
welfare). 
 34.  Id.; see also Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 
1279–80 (1989) (advocating a new rights-based analysis centered on negative rights). 
 35.  See Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312, 314 
(1967) (arguing that there is no useful distinction between abstract and theoretical notions of 
positive and negative rights). 
Larson-Macro (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016  5:00 PM 
Fall 2015] ADAPTING HUMAN RIGHTS 9 
opportunities, judicial process, and security.36 Yet arguably, that 
minimum level of government provision of goods and services would 
not be achieved without restrictions on government interference with 
speech, assembly, liberty, and property.37 Additionally, any legal right, 
whether positive or negative, requires the government to provide 
something.38 Even an ostensibly negative right like freedom of speech 
arguably requires the state provide a forum in which that right can be 
delineated, adjudicated, and enforced.39 In a sense, therefore, a right 
is like a magnet, having both a positive and negative pole. 
Despite this “rights polarity,” the distinction between positive 
and negative rights remains useful.40 In international law, the 
distinction is often drawn between “civil and political rights” (roughly 
the corollary of negative rights) and “economic, social, and cultural 
rights” (roughly the corollary of positive rights).41 Civil and political 
rights in international law have proven relatively uncontroversial and 
effectively enforceable, with an existing protocol for bringing claims 
of rights violations to international tribunals.42 Economic, social, and 
cultural rights, on the other hand, lack a binding protocol for 
adjudicating claims, and require states only to progressively realize 
these rights subject to available resources.43 International human 
 
 36.  See Theodor Meron, Norm Making and Supervision in International Human Rights: 
Reflections on Institutional Order, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 754, 757 (1982) (noting that developing 
countries must achieve “a level of economic development that enables them to implement social 
rights, and that those states must therefore give priority to social rights and to economic and 
social development in order to facilitate the realization of civil and political rights.”). 
 37.  Id. at 756–58 (noting that despite the need to promote social and economic rights, civil 
and political rights “lend themselves. . . to immediate implementation.”). 
 38.  Cross, supra note 3, at 864–65 (noting that “all rights, including negative ones, require 
government enforcement.”). 
 39.  Id.; see also New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2203. 
 40.  Cross, supra note 3, at 865–67. 
 41.  See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 52, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter “the 
CP Covenant”] (asserting every citizen’s right to basic human liberties including self-
determination); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 
1966) [hereinafter “the ESC Covenant”] (resolving that states party to the covenant will actively 
promote citizens’ fundamental rights); see also New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2185–86. 
 42.  See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966) 
[hereinafter “Optional Protocol to CP Covenant”]. 
 43.  See ESC Covenant, supra note 41; see also Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10 2008) 
[hereinafter “Optional Protocol to the ESC Covenant”] (establishing protocol for states party to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights). 
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rights law illustrates that, while the conceptual distinction between 
positive and negative rights is difficult to draw, practical differences in 
enforceability and the political viability of implementation make the 
distinction relevant.44  The question still remains how to draw the 
practical distinction.45 
The distinction I propose is based on the aim of the right. Where 
the aim of a right is the provision of a primary good, it is a positive 
right; otherwise, it is a negative right. For purposes of distinguishing 
positive and negative rights, primary goods are the minimum amount 
of those goods and services necessary for basic human welfare and 
opportunity for civic engagement – a minimum quantity and quality 
of water, food, shelter [including light and heat], health care, and 
education.46 
The aim of positive rights is to make primary goods, those goods 
and services essential for basic human dignity, affordable and 
accessible to all.47 It is an approach intended to “put first things first” 
– to provide a baseline level of health and security, without which any 
other right would be meaningless.48 It is born of the intuition that the 
state cannot approach someone dying of thirst or freezing to death 
and say, “[a]t least you still have the writ of habeas corpus.” The 
intent of distinguishing positive and negative rights in this paper is not 
to advocate for or against positive rights. Instead, it is to define the 
positive rights approach in order to understand why it is problematic 
when applied to public utilities, and whether such problems are 
surmountable. 
 
 44.  See Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History, 
Meaning, and the Controversy Over-Privatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89, 113–14 (2013) 
(summarizing the obligations associated with a human right to water under international law). 
 45.  Cross, supra note 3, at 866 (proposing a simple question to reveal the distinction 
between positive and negative rights — “If there was no government in existence, would the 
right be automatically fulfilled?”). But this test requires an assumption of the absence of 
government that does little to help formulate a practical distinction in a world of government 
protected rights. 
 46.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971) (“[S]uppose that the basic structure of 
society distributes certain primary goods, that is, things that every rational man is presumed to 
want. . . . For simplicity, assume that the chief primary goods at the disposition of society are 
rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth.”); see also New Right in Water, supra 
note 4, at 2200–01. 
 47.  Wenonah Hauter, The Limits of International Human Rights Law and the Role of Food 
Sovereignty in Protecting People from Further Trade Liberalization under the Doha Round 
Negotiations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1071, 1083 (2007). 
 48.  Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121–22 
(1969); see also New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2200. 
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B. The Characteristics of Public Utilities 
To understand why the application of a positive right to public 
utilities is problematic, and to evaluate how those problems might be 
addressed, it is necessary to understand the nature of public utilities. 
For the purpose of this article, public utilities are natural monopolies 
directly dependent upon exhaustible natural resources.49 This 
definition includes, in particular, water treatment and distribution, 
wastewater collection, treatment and disposal, and energy 
transmission. 
A natural monopoly occurs when (1) there are significant 
barriers to entry into the market, particularly due to large initial 
capital requirements that effectively bar potential competitors; and 
(2) large economies of scale, such that there are very low marginal 
costs, allowing the natural monopoly to serve additional consumers 
more efficiently than any potential competitor.50 Water, sanitation, 
and electrical transmission are examples of natural monopolies. The 
high initial capital requirements effectively bar competitors from the 
market, and large economies of scale allow providers to serve 
additional customers at low marginal costs.51 It is difficult for a 
newcomer to compete with a system where the costly plants, pipes, 
and lines have already been laid, and when it is so much cheaper to 
simply extend the existing system to serve one more customer than to 
attempt to compete from scratch.52 
These natural monopolies create challenges with respect to 
pricing, particularly where they involve private property that has 
become “affected with a public interest,” or private property that the 
general public must be able to access.53 In such cases, consumers have 
 
 49.  Water remains a part of the hydrologic cycle, and thus is in some sense “renewable.” 
However, where consumption outstrips natural replenishment, the water source is effectively 
exhausted. See, e.g., Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerations for Water Law, 56 
ALA. L. REV. 1009 (2005). 
 50.  See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1401 (1998) (analyzing why regulation of public utility 
monopolies fail). 
 51.  See generally Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. 
REV. 548 (1969) (discussing whether natural monopolies justify the imposition of regulations). 
 52.  Id.; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An 
American Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1287 (1984) (explaining the principle 
that incumbent operators often wish to make outsiders’ entry into the market difficult). 
 53.  See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1877) (explaining when “one devotes his 
property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest 
in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent 
of the interest he has thus created”). 
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no choice but to buy from the monopoly.54 Without traditional market 
forces to restrain pricing, natural monopolies are typically subject to 
rate-setting by the state to curb monopolistic pricing.55 Where the 
natural monopoly is not a state agency, but is instead a regulated 
private entity, it has a quid pro quo relationship with the state – the 
state grants a monopoly to provide a certain service to a certain 
geographic area over a specified period of time (often through a 
“concession contract”) in exchange for the utility company assuming 
certain affirmative duties.56 These common law duties can largely be 
summed up as obligations to fairly and equitably serve all similarly 
situated customers upon reasonable terms, with contract terms 
related to service construed strictly in favor of the public.57 The state 
typically determines the reasonableness of prices and the scope of the 
monopoly, either through the regulatory process, the concession 
contract, or some combination of the two.58 
While there are many approaches to rate setting, the process 
typically involves setting tariffs to allow the utility to recover the cost 
of service and provide a rate of return for the utility company on its 
large initial fixed-cost capital investment (called the rate base) to 
satisfy investors and creditors.59 The rate of return must be sufficient 
to ensure institutional confidence in the financial integrity of the 
utility company.60 Therefore, the object of price regulation is to 
achieve a balance of production and profit for the utility company 
while ensuring that prices charged to consumers are reasonable.61 
Other types of infrastructure, which have been historically 
 
 54.  See generally id. (implying that consumers must buy from natural monopolies where 
they exist). 
 55.  Posner, supra note 51, at 611. 
 56.  Jim Chen, The Nature of the Public Utility: Infrastructure, the Market, and the Law, 98 
NW. U. L. REV. 1617, 1640–41 (2004). 
 57.  City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1335 (N.D. Ind. 
1979); see also United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of Kentucky, 278 U.S. 300, 309 (1929) 
(“The primary duty of a public utility is to serve on reasonable terms all those who desire the 
service it renders.”); see generally Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837) 
(holding that public utility concession contracts are construed strictly in favor of the public). 
 58.  See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1335–36 (1998) (noting the shift in many instances 
from rates set on utilities and common carriers through the regulatory process to a contract-
based regime). 
 59.  Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive 
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549, 562–64 (1979). 
 60.  FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). 
 61.  See id. (“The rate-making process . . . i.e., the fixing of ‘just and reasonable’ rates, 
involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.”). 
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regulated like public utilities, such as transportation or 
telecommunications systems, are excluded from “public utilities” for 
the purpose of this paper. These enterprises do not raise similar 
concerns of sustainability, either because they do not directly depend 
on exhaustible natural resources or because market forces create 
efficient and effective pricing mechanisms for cost-internalization and 
conservation incentives. Additionally, there has been far less 
advocacy for, and attempts to implement, a positive rights approach 
to these types of regulated industries as compared to water, 
sanitation, and energy. However, as all infrastructures depend at least 
indirectly on exhaustible natural resources, and as some have begun 
calling for a human right to the internet, this paper’s evaluation of the 
positive right to public utilities and its prescriptions for implementing 
that right may become relevant in other fields of infrastructure 
development and regulation.62 
C. Applying Positive Rights to Public Utilities 
Public utilities are important to human welfare by their very 
nature. A normal enterprise becomes a regulated public utility 
because it is “affected with the public interest.”63 It is because these 
enterprises are so essential to the public interest that they are often 
considered good candidates for the positive right status.64 Indeed, in 
some sense, the common law duty of public utilities to serve 
constitutes a positive right.65 According to this view, the theory behind 
this duty is that because these services are essential, and because 
consumers have no choice but to seek these services from the natural 
monopoly, the natural monopoly therefore has an affirmative duty to 
provide those services at a reasonable price.66 The same rationale 
 
 62.  See, e.g., Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
393, 397 (2013). 
 63.  Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1877). 
 64.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2198–00. See also Samuel R. Olken, The Decline 
of Legal Classicism and the Evolution of New Deal Constitutionalism, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
2051, 2078 (2014) (noting that the phrase “affected with a public interest” is not a closed class 
and is imprecise in its meaning). 
 65.  RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
CARE? 14–19 (1997) (arguing that the only positive rights that should be recognized by law are 
private necessity—the use of another’s property without consent in an emergency—and the duty 
of public utilities and common carriers to serve). 
 66.  Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and Improper Considerations: A Common-Law 
Model for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination in the Contracting Process, 62 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 183, 203 (1993); see also Charles Fairman, The So-Called Granger Cases, Lord Hale, and 
Justice Bradley, 5 STAN. L. REV. 587, 670–673 (1953). 
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arguably supports a positive right to public utilities.67 
In an attempt to encourage equitable provision of public utility 
services, many have argued in favor of a positive rights approach.68 
Like the duty to serve, a positive right to public utilities would 
provide a bulwark against inequity.69 Without a positive right to 
public utilities, some fear that a utility company’s profit motive will 
result in unaffordable monopolistic rates for the poor.70 A positive 
right to public utilities would, in theory, at least guarantee a minimum 
quantity and quality of energy, drinking water, and sanitation for all.71 
Also, like the duty to serve, a positive right would provide a 
mechanism to hold government regulators and utility companies 
accountable for the management of resources and infrastructure 
affecting the public interest.72 
Unlike the duty to serve, however, the positive rights approach 
has particular value to policy entrepreneurs looking to raise the 
profile of global problems like energy services, sanitation, and the 
inequitable distribution of adequate drinking water.73 The rationale is 
 
 67.  Id.; see also Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and 
Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1329 (1996); William E. McCurdy, The Power of a 
Public Utility to Fix its Rates and Charges in the Absence of Regulatory Legislation, 38 HARV. L. 
REV. 202, 206–08 (1924). 
 68.  See, e.g., Stefan H. Krieger, An Advocacy Model for Representation of Low-Income 
Intervenors in State Public Utility Proceedings, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 639, 698 (1990) (noting that an 
advocate for indigent consumers “can frame the issue as significant for the whole consuming 
public (utility service as a ‘basic human right’ for all consumers) rather than as a subsidy for the 
poor (regulation as income redistribution)”). 
 69.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2197; see also Barton H. Thompson, Water as a 
Public Commodity, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 17, 38 (2011) (discussing example of privatization of 
water company in Bolivia, and ensuing rate increases, leading to inequity). 
 70.  See Jennifer Davis, Private-Sector Participation in the Water and Sanitation Sector, 30 
ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 145, 166–67 (2005) (“[M]uch of the empirical literature on 
[private sector participation] in [water and sewer] service delivery documents increases in 
monthly service fees following privatization.”). 
 71.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2198; see also David R. Boyd, No Taps, No 
Toilets: First Nations and the Constitutional Right to Water in Canada, 57 MCGILL L.J. 81, 122 
(2011) (“There are a number of reasons why it is important to recognize that access to safe 
drinking water is a legally protected human right, rather than a commodity or a service provided 
on a charitable basis.”). 
 72.  Boyd, supra note 71, at 122–23 (arguing that recognizing a right to water will “provide 
a means of holding governments accountable”). 
 73.  See generally Jeanne Luh, Rachel Baum & Jamie Bartram, Equity in Water and 
Sanitation: Developing an Index to Measure Progressive Realization of the Human Right, 216 
INT’L J. OF HYGIENE & ENVTL. HEALTH 662 (2012) (discussing the challenges of measuring 
equitable access to drinking water and sanitation services in developing countries); Kilian 
Reiche, et al., Expanding Electricity Access to Remote Areas: Off-Grid Rural Electrification in 
Developing Countries, WORLD POWER 2000 52–60 (Guy Isherwood ed., 2000) (cataloging the 
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that primary goods such as these should have a higher priority, and 
thinking in terms of rights raises the profile of those primary goods.74 
By using positive rights rhetoric in advocating for the equitable 
provision of public utility services, policy entrepreneurs are 
attempting to put first things first.75 
Relying on these rationales, the positive rights approach has 
been advocated or applied in the drinking water, sanitation, and 
energy sectors.76 Energy, sanitation and water are linked in public 
policy debates because each is embedded in the other.77 As water is 
required to produce virtually all goods, the costs associated with 
water development are embedded in all goods, a concept called 
“virtual water.”78 The same is certainly true of “virtual energy.”79  In 
particular, energy and water have virtual versions of the other 
embedded in their production, as water treatment and transportation 
is highly energy intensive, and the energy industry is one of the 
largest water consumers in the world.80 Sanitation is also extremely 
energy and water intensive, and thus has a high amount of both 
energy and water embedded in collection, treatment, and disposal.81 
Energy, sanitation, and water services have also become interrelated 
as important markers of economic development.82 The 
interdependent nature of energy, sanitation and water make the 
 
challenges associated with inequitable energy access in developing countries). 
 74.   New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2198 (citing Daniel Bodansky, Climate Change 
and Human Rights: Unpacking the Issues, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 511, 514 (2010) (noting 
the role of rights rhetoric in raising the profile and priority of certain policy aims in the context 
of climate change)). 
 75.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2198. 
 76.  See, e.g., Stephen R. Tully, The Contribution of Human Rights to Universal Energy 
Access, 4 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 518 (2006) (discussing the role of human rights approaches in 
expanding energy access); New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2205–08 (cataloging the various 
approaches to the human right to water). 
 77.  See generally Christopher A. Scott & Martin J. Pasqualetti, Energy and Water 
Resources Scarcity: Critical Infrastructure for Growth and Economic Development in Arizona 
and Sonora, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645 (2010). 
 78.  J.A. Allan, Virtual Water – The Water, Food, and Trade Nexus: Useful Concept or 
Misleading Metaphor, 28 WATER INT’L 4, 106 (2003). 
 79.  Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 933–34. 
 80.  See generally Peter H. Gleick, Water and Energy, 19 ANN. REV. ENERGY ENVT. 267 
(1994). 
 81.  A.K. Plappally & J.H. Leinhard, Energy Requirements for Water Production, 
Treatment, End Use, Reclamation, and Disposal, 16 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY 
REV. 4818 (2012) (discussing the high energy requirements for sanitation services); Carey W. 
King, et al., Coherence Between Water and Energy Polices, 53 NAT. RESOURCES J. 117, 145 
(2013) (noting the high consumption of fresh water and energy in the sanitation sector). 
 82.  Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 935–36. 
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promotion of any one as a human right effectively the promotion of 
all three as human rights. 
The positive right to water is a commonly-implemented positive 
right to goods and services provided by public utilities,83 and thus 
provides a useful example of how that kind of right is typically 
formulated. Currently, forty-one nations have recognized the right to 
water within their national constitutions, or have otherwise 
referenced the right within national legislation.84 For example, Article 
43 of the Constitution of Kenya provides that “[e]very person has the 
right . . . to clean and safe water in adequate quantities.”85 Article 5 of 
Indonesia’s Law on Water Resources86 provides that the state 
guarantees individual access and availability of water for everyone 
residing within that nation.87 Article 66(2) of the Constitution of 
Ecuador88 recognizes the right to “clean water.”89 In each case, the 
right need only be progressively realized subject to available 
resources.90 Some nations, such as Uganda and Zambia, frame the 
right simply as a “compelling interest” or a government “objective,” 
subject to available resources.91 
In other cases, nations may not have constitutionally or 
statutorily recognized the right, but have inferred it from other 
 
 83.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2205. 
 84. See The Rights to Water and Sanitation in National Law, RIGHTTOWATER (Apr. 8, 
2010), http://www.righttowater.info/progress-so-far/national-legislation-on-the-right-to-water 
(listing forty-one nations that have recognized water rights in constitutions, national laws, 
executive proclamations, judicial decisions, and proposed legislation). 
 85. CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, art. 43(1)(d) (2010) (Kenya). 
 86. Law on Water Resources, No. 7 of 2004 (Indon.), reprinted in 2 L. ENV’T & DEV. J. 118, 
122 (2006) [hereinafter “Water Resources Law”], available at http://www.lead-
journal.org/content/06118.pdf. 
 87. See id. (“The State guarantees everyone’s right to obtain water for their minimum daily 
basic needs in order to achieve a healthy, clean, and productive life.”). 
 88. CONSTITUTION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL EQUADOR [C.P.] art. 66(2), available 
at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ ecuador08.html#mozTocId64283. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See, e.g., id. arts. 3(1), 11(8) (mandating that the right to water, like all other 
constitutional rights, “shall be developed progressively” through standards, case law, and public 
policy). 
 91. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA (1995) arts. I, XIV(b), available at 
http://www.parliament.go.ug/new/images/stories/constitution/Constitution_of_Uganda_1995.pdf 
(establishing the right to “clean and safe water” as an objective that will guide the state in 
making and implementing policy decisions); CONST. OF ZAMBIA of 1991 (as amended by Act 
No. 18 of 1996) §§ 111, 112(d), available at http://www.parliament.gov.zm/ 
downloads/VOLUME%201.pdf (stating that the government “shall endeavor” to provide clean 
and safe water, but that this policy principle is not “legally enforceable” in any court or 
tribunal). 
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express rights on the grounds that the realization of any right depends 
on a minimum provision of primary goods.92 For example, the 
Supreme Court of India inferred the right to water from other express 
constitutional rights.93 A similar approach can be observed in 
Pakistan94 and Bangladesh.95 It is not difficult to imagine how similar 
inferences could be made about a right to sanitation or energy. 
In the United States, California is the only state to explicitly 
adopt a human right to water, in addition to recognizing the right to 
sanitation as well.96 Governor Jerry Brown signed Assembly Bill 685 
into law in 2012, recognizing that “every human being has the right to 
safe, clean, affordable, and accessible water adequate for human 
consumption, cooking, and sanitary purposes.”97 The law requires 
state agencies to consider the human right to water when “revising, 
adopting, or establishing policies, regulations, and grant criteria.”98 
California is not the only jurisdiction to explicitly recognize a 
human right to sanitation. South Africa, Ecuador, and Uruguay have 
also recognized the right to sanitation in their respective 
constitutions.99 Other countries, including Costa Rica, Bangladesh, 
 
 92. See, e.g., Monique Passelec-Ross & Karin Buss, Water Stewardship in the Lower 
Athabasca River: Is the Alberta Government Paying Attention to Aboriginal Rights to Water?, 23 
J. ENVT’L L. & PRAC. 1, 17 (2011) (discussing how provincial governments in Canada have 
inferred aboriginal water rights from express constitutional guarantees to a right of subsistence 
on traditional lands). 
 93. See Chameli Singh v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1051, 1053 (India) (stating that 
the right to water is implied by the “right to life enshrined under Article 21” of the Indian 
Constitution); INDIA CONST. art. 21 (“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty 
except according to procedure established by law.”). 
 94. See George S. McGraw, Defining and Defending the Right to Water and Its Minimum 
Core: Legal Construction and the Role of National Jurisprudence, 8 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 
127, 176–77 (2011) (discussing General Secretary v. Director, (1994) SCMR 2061 (Pak.), in 
which the Pakistani Supreme Court declared that the right to have water free from pollution is 
essential to life itself). 
 95. See id. at 175 (discussing Farooque v. Bangladesh (Radioactive Milk Powder), (1996) 
WP 92/1996 S.C. ¶ 20 (Nepal), in which the Bangladeshi Supreme Court declared that the right 
to life includes the right to enjoyment of pollution-free water). 
 96.  California Assembly Bill 685 [hereinafter, Assembly Bill 685]; see also The Human 
Right to Water Bill in California: An Implementation Framework for State Agencies (May 2013), 
International Human Rights Law Clinic, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, SCHOOL OF L., available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Water_Report_2013_Interactive_FINAL.pdf (proposing a 
framework for implementing AB 685). 
 97.  Assembly Bill 685. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  THORSTEN KIEFER ET AL., CENTER ON HOUSING RIGHTS AND EVICTIONS, LEGAL 
RESOURCES FOR THE RIGHT TO WATER AND SANITATION, 59–62 (2d ed. 2008), available at 
http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/wwc/Programs/Right_to_Water/Pdf_doct/RWP-
Legal_Res_1st_Draft_web.pdf. 
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and Sri Lanka, have referenced a human right to sanitation in 
national legislation.100 South Africa has explicitly recognized the right 
to access to electricity.101 The formulation of these rights has proven 
similar to that of the right to water – vague, largely aspirational, and 
requiring either consideration only or progressive realization based 
on available resources.102 The way in which these rights are 
formulated, combined with the characteristics of public utilities, 
makes the application of a positive right to public utilities uniquely 
challenging. 
South Africa provides a useful example for the challenges 
associated with a positive right to public utilities. In 1997, South 
Africa became one of the first nations to explicitly recognize a 
positive right to water in its Constitution.103 Section 27 of the South 
African Constitution provides that everyone “has the right to have 
access to . . . sufficient food and water.”104 In Phiri, a poor township of 
over one million residents in the city of Johannesburg, the city 
government attempted to comply with this right by charging a flat 
rate for water services to Phiri residents.105  However, because of 
illegal connections, unpaid water bills, overconsumption, and leaky 
pipes, Johannesburg generated only one percent of its water revenue 
from deliveries to Phiri, despite the fact that Phiri received a third of 
the city’s water.106 
The flat rate approach thus proved financially and ecologically 
 
 100.  Id. at 75. 
 101.  Jenny Sin-Hang Ngai, Energy as a Human Right in Armed Conflict: A Question of 
Universal Need, Survival, and Human Dignity, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 579, 614–15 (2012). 
 102.  See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631, 
1655 (2009) (noting the role of the term “progressive realization” in the positive rights approach 
in the South African constitution). 
 103. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 27(1), available at http://www.info.gov.za/ 
documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf; See also Andrew L. Magaziner, The Trickle Down 
Effect: The Phiri Water Rights Application and Evaluating, Understanding, and Enforcing the 
South African Constitutional Right to Water, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 509, 510 (2008). 
 104.  S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 27(1). 
 105.  Stephen C. McCaffrey & Kate J. Neville, Small Capacity and Big Responsibilities: 
Financial and Legal Implications of a Human Right to Water for Developing Countries, 21 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 679, 686–87 (2009). 
 106.  See Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 6–7 paras.11–12, 179 (S. 
Afr.) (noting that “the rate of payment of municipal bills was less than 10%”); see also 
COALITION AGAINST WATER PRIVATISATION ET AL., THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENT 
DISCONNECTIONS: PREPAID METERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE IN PHIRI, SOWETO, at 6 
(2004), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Phiri.pdf (listing illegal water connections 
as a major contributing factor to Johannesburg Water’s decision to seek new methods for water 
distribution in poor South African townships like Phiri). 
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unsustainable in South Africa.107 Too few were paying for water, and 
even those who paid the flat rate had no incentive to conserve water 
once they paid.108 Without adequate revenue from water deliveries, 
infrastructure degraded (meaning more leaks and more nonrevenue 
water), water supplies diminished, and water could not be treated to a 
healthy level.109 Johannesburg ultimately abandoned the flat rate 
approach, instead seeking an alternative strategy to satisfy the 
positive right to water without aggravating sustainability concerns.110 
The City, pursuant to national legislation, enacted ordinances to 
deliver “free basic water” (6 kiloliters per household per month) with 
any amount above that requiring pre-payment.111  Citizens of Phiri 
successfully challenged the “free basic water” and pre-payment 
approach as a violation of their constitutional right to water at the 
trial and appellate court levels.112 The trial court concluded that the 
constitutional right required delivery of 50 liters per person per day.113 
On appeal, the court ruled that the constitutional right required 
delivery of 42 liters per person per day.114 Ultimately, the city 
prevailed on appeal to the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
which deferred to the City’s determination on how best to achieve 
sustainable resource and infrastructure management.115 
 
 107.  Linda Stewart & Debra Horsten, The Role of Sustainability in the Adjudication of the 
Right to Access to Adequate Water, 24 SA PUBLIC LAW 486, 493 (2009). 
 108.  Tracy Humby & Maryse Grandbois, The Human Right to Water in South Africa and 
the Mazibuko Decisions, 51 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT 521, 527 (2010); Michael Kidd, South 
Africa: The Development of Water Law, in THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND POLITICS OF 
WATER (Joseph W. Dellapenna & Joyeeta Gupta eds., 2009), 100, 100–01(noting that 
conservation and sustainable management were two major challenges associated with the South 
African constitutional right of access to water). 
 109.  Humby, supra note 108, at 527; see also Mazibuko at 6–7 (noting that steel pipes in 
Soweto was used without attention to corrosion protection, resulting in water leakages); Erik B. 
Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 980 
(2004) (noting the tension between South Africa’s human right approach to water and the goal 
of maintaining infrastructure). 
 110.   See Mazibuko at 7 (describing Johannesburg Water’s plan to change water usage in 
Soweto). 
 111.  Humby, supra note 108, at 530; see also Mazibuko at 6–7. 
 112.  Mazibuko at 12–18. Importantly, other more affluent white neighborhoods in 
Johannesburg were not required to use prepaid meters, and this was successfully challenged at 
the time on grounds of racial discrimination. Additionally, the free provision of 6 kl per 
household was intended to provide 25 liters per person per day, but the city failed to account for 
the number of people within each household in Phiri. 
 113.  Id. at 14. 
 114.  Id. at 18. 
 115.  Id. at 28–34 (reviewing for reasonableness because “courts are ill-placed to make these 
assessments for both institutional and democratic reasons”). 
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The challenges South Africa faced in implementing a 
constitutional right to water in Phiri illustrate the difficulties likely 
facing any government implementing a positive right to a public 
utility. Indeed, South Africa’s struggles to implement such a positive 
right are not atypical. In India, for instance, the Supreme Court 
inferred a positive right to water from the constitutional right to life 
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.116 The Court stated that 
“the right to access to clean drinking water is fundamental to life and 
there is a duty on the state under Article 21 to provide clean drinking 
water to its citizens.”117 Despite this positive right, as of 2004, 17% of 
the population in India did not have access to tapped, treated water, 
including 38% percent of urban residents.118 Eighty percent of 
children in India suffer from water-borne diseases, with a total of 44 
million suffering from illnesses related to poor water quality.119 India’s 
recognition of the provisional right to water illustrates the larger 
reality—adopting a positive right to public utilities does not 
necessarily improve access to water, sanitation, and energy.120 The 
mere recognition of a right in a judicial opinion or constitution is 
meaningless without effective regulation and institutional 
competency. 
II. WHY POSITIVE RIGHTS TO PUBLIC UTILITIES REQUIRE 
ADAPTATION 
The positive right to public utilities is typically formulated in a 
way that leaves fundamental questions of price, quality, access, and 
sustainability unanswered.121 The South African Constitution provides 
“the right to have access to . . . sufficient food and water,” but does 
not explain what would qualify as sufficient..122 In India, there is “a 
 
 116. INDIA CONST. art. 21 (providing due process protection for life and liberty). 
 117. A.P. Pollution Control Bd. II v. Naidu, (2000) 5 S.C.R. 249, 249 (India), available at 
http://www.ielrc.org/content/e0010.pdf. 
 118. Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 981 (2004). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See David Zetland, Water Rights and Human Rights: The Poor Will Not Need Our 
Charity if We Need Their Water, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, Aug. 11, 2011, at 5–7, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1549570 (relying on data for improved water access before and after 
enactment of a constitutional right to water in 12 countries compared to 12 similar countries 
lacking a constitutional right to water, an empirical analysis demonstrated no impact on 
improved water access arising from enactment of a constitutional right to water). 
 121.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2184. 
 122.  S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §27(1), available at www.gov.za/documents/constitution-
republic-south-africa-1996. 
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duty on the state . . . to provide clean drinking water to its citizens,” 
but the precise requirements of that duty are left to courts and 
agencies to determine with little guidance.123 And while the right to 
water provides the most common example of attempts to implement a 
positive right to public utilities, similar ambiguity exists in providing 
the right to energy and sanitation as well.124 This ambiguity often 
leaves courts, which typically lack the necessary expertise, to either 
make difficult decisions on resource sustainability and rate-setting, or 
else to defer to executive agencies or the legislature; thereby, 
weakening the role of the courts as mere arbiters of constitutionally 
guaranteed rights.125 
The characteristics of public utilities do not lend themselves to 
the straightforward application of a vaguely worded, aspirational 
positive right. Public utilities are capital intensive.126  Public utilities 
also uniquely and directly depend on exhaustible natural resources, 
and provide processed or treated versions of natural resources as 
their primary service.127  Additionally, unlike other candidates for 
positive rights, distribution of resources by public utilities inherently 
involves natural monopolies.128 Thus, the characteristics of public 
utilities are distinguishable from other positive rights in that there is 
often no competition to regulate prices, resulting in underpricing and 
little consumer incentive to conserve natural resources.  
This Part provides three reasons why positive rights to public 
utilities require adaptive implementation: (A) tribunals adjudicating 
positive rights claims typically lack the necessary institutional 
competency to effectively decide cases involving complex issues of 
resource sustainability and rate-setting, particularly where the right is 
formulated in vague and aspirational terms; (B) the potential cost 
 
 123. A.P. Pollution Control Bd. II v. Naidu, (2000) 5 S.C.R. 249, 249 (India), available at 
http://www.ielrc.org/content/e0010.pdf. 
 124. Cross, supra note 3, at 901 (noting that positive rights tend to be vague and 
indeterminate); Murthy, supra note 44, at 95 (noting that the human right to sanitation involves 
questions of equity, affordability, and sustainability). 
 125.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1441, 1480 (2008) (noting that courts have little competence in evaluating policy 
arguments in technical fields like public utilities); Cross, supra note 3, at 901 (arguing that, when 
faced with “imperfect information” about specific conditions, judges “are likely to do very little 
to promote the ends commanded by [positive] rights”). 
 126.  Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 887 (1980). 
 127.  See, e.g., King, et al., supra note 81, at 145 (describing the resource use required for 
wastewater treatment). 
 128. See generally WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL 
MONOPOLY (1983). 
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reduction impact of a positive right to water can make the right 
economically and ecologically unsustainable because providers fail to 
recover costs of service and consumers fail to internalize the cost of 
consumption; and (C) the positive right to water can eliminate 
incentives for public engagement and oversight, and tend to facilitate 
rent-seeking by utility companies and corruption by utility regulators. 
A. Positive Rights to Public Utilities and Enforceability 
As seen in the example of India above, and as borne out in 
empirical comparisons between countries recognizing a positive right 
to public utility services and those that do not, actual provision of an 
adequate public utility service does not necessarily follow from the 
legal recognition of a positive right.129 One of the most common 
reasons positive rights in any policy arena fail is due to the lack of 
effective enforcement.130 As the arbiter of rights, the judiciary may 
lack necessary institutional competency, as compared to other 
governmental entities, to effectively establish minimum quantities 
and qualities, and maximum and minimum prices, for services 
provided by public utilities.131 In short, a positive right to public 
utilities implicates the “familiar difficulties with judicial enforcement 
of affirmative duties.”132 
Furthermore, the nature of the judiciary also limits the 
enforceability of a positive right to public utilities because courts 
generally lack the necessary expertise to flesh out the precise duties 
prescribed by the right. The Constitutional Court in Mazibuko 
ultimately deferred to the City’s established minimum amount and 
pre-payment requirement based on what the Court called “an 
understanding of the proper role of courts in our constitutional 
democracy.”133 The Constitutional Court stated that “[i]t is 
institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine precisely what 
the achievement of any particular social and economic right entails 
and what steps government should take to ensure the progressive 
 
 129. See generally Zetland, supra note 120. 
 130. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1336 (2d ed. 
1988) (stating that affirmative obligations placed upon governments to provide basic sustenance 
to their citizens would be subject to difficulties with judicial enforcement). 
 131. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 618–23 (1923) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Court does not have the institutional capabilities to determine the 
proper allocation of natural gas between Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia). 
 132. TRIBE, supra note 130, at 1336. 
 133.  Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 28 (S. Afr.). 
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realization of the right. This is a matter, in the first place, for the 
legislature and executive, the institutions of government best placed 
to investigate social conditions in the light of available budgets and to 
determine what targets are achievable in relation to social and 
economic rights.”134 
Answering the fundamental questions underlying a positive right 
to public utilities is particularly complicated because the answer 
cannot simply be about the minimum quantity and quality for survival 
– everyone alive already has that minimum amount.135 Instead, the 
answer depends on the highly technical determination of a minimum 
amount and quality for survival at a maximum price, and also about 
the nuanced issue of achieving a certain standard of living, which 
involves even more complex matters of culture, economics, 
sustainability, equity, and geography.136 
Executive agencies and legislatures have taken two different 
approaches to the formulation and implementation of positive rights 
to public utilities, each problematic.137 The first is to establish a broad, 
guiding principle in the formulation of the right (for example, a 
simple guarantee of “sufficient water”), allowing courts to enforce the 
principle on a case-by-case basis.138 However, such ambiguity raises 
serious enforcement challenges.139 Where courts lack information and 
expertise regarding state budgets and revenue, the enforcement of a 
positive right can create serious fiscal problems.140 Where courts lack 
information and expertise regarding local conditions, including 
population density, consumption patterns, hydrology, climate, and 
ecology, judicial enforcement of positive rights may prove inadequate 
 
 134. Id. at 30 para. 61. 
 135.  Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 958 (“A central question at the heart of food, 
water, and energy security is: ‘How much?’ With water, the answer cannot be ‘enough to stay 
alive.’ There are only two kinds of people on earth – people with enough water to stay alive and 
dead people.”). 
 136.  See id. (“The real question . . . is: ‘How much to achieve what standard of living’?”). 
 137.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2216. 
 138.  Id. 
 139. See Cross, supra note 3, at 901 (“While all language is somewhat ambiguous, positive 
rights . . . suffer from particular indeterminacy. The reason for this indeterminacy is that such 
rights are consequentialist, requiring the judiciary to create a program that achieves a given 
result.”). 
 140. See PATRICK MONAHAN, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CHARTER, 
FEDERALISM AND THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 126 (1987) (arguing that if courts were to 
enforce provision rights, they would become embroiled in the same budgetary and tax debates 
that the concept of judicial review was designed to avoid in the first place). 
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or overreaching.141 
To avoid these problems, executive agencies and legislatures may 
take a second approach by quantifying the minimum quantity and 
quality of public utilities services required to meet a positive right.142 
This effectively helps to relieve ill-equipped courts from the burden 
of adjudicating complex ecologic and economic questions.143 However, 
such rigid minimum standards may prove unworkable as conditions 
differ both temporally and spatially from case to case. For example, 
changes in climate and population can quickly make a minimum 
standard obsolete.144 To the extent that courts meaningfully evaluate 
these minimum standards, they are left to make ad hoc 
determinations of the viability of these minimum standards under 
different localized conditions.145 As with fleshing out vague and 
indeterminate guarantees of “sufficient” water, courts are often 
forced to make technical determinations for which they are ill-suited, 
even when a minimum standard is established.146 The courts are then 
faced with the familiar challenge of determining the degree to which 
they should defer to standards established by executive agencies in 
implementing the legal right in question.147 
The judicial application of what is termed the “Ben Avon 
doctrine” in the United States illustrates the challenges associated 
with judicial review of agency actions in the realm of public utilities.148 
 
 141. See Cross, supra note 3, at 901 (arguing that, when faced with “imperfect information” 
about specific conditions, judges “are likely to do very little to promote the ends commanded by 
[provision] rights”). 
 142. See, e.g., New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2217 (describing Johannesburg’s standard 
of six kiloliters per month per household). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Melissa J. Luttrell, The Case for Differential Discounting: How a Small Rate Change 
Could Help Agencies Save More Lives and Make More Sense, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 80, 
95–96 (2011). 
 145.  Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 83–85 (S. Afr.) (noting that 
the South African Constitutional Court has previously expressed the difficulties associated with 
deciding cases that have broad social and economic consequences); Cross, supra note 3, at 903–
05 (illustrating the complexities associated with judicial enforcement of positive rights such as “a 
minimal level of subsistence”). 
 146. See Christine A. Klein & Ling-Yee Huang, Cultural Norms as a Source of Law: The 
Example of Bottled Water, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 507, 534 (2008) (arguing that state legislatures 
in the United States have failed to adequately update the “law governing the initial 
appropriation of water resources” and that courts deciding cases concerning bottled water 
“necessarily produc[e] reactive and fact-specific decisions, rather than comprehensive legislative 
guidance”). 
 147.  See id., at 535 (recounting an example where the Texas Supreme Court deferred). 
 148.  Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergency of New 
Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 430–31 (2007); see generally Ohio Valley 
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Where a government agency sets a public utility’s rate so low that it 
effectively requires the company to use its property for the public 
benefit without just compensation, the rate is confiscatory and 
constitutes an unlawful exercise of eminent domain power.149 In Ben 
Avon, the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts review agency 
ratemaking decisions de novo where the utility company claims that 
the rate is confiscatory, because the question is one of a fundamental 
constitutional right.150 The rationale behind the Ben Avon doctrine is 
that, courts should give greater scrutiny to agency determinations in 
questions of infringement of fundamental constitutional rights.151 
More recently, courts have moved away from the Ben Avon doctrine 
and have instead been highly deferential to agency ratemaking 
determinations for public utilities.152 The rationale behind this move is 
that value of the judicial protection against agency overreach in 
ratemaking is outweighed by the court’s relative lack of expertise and 
the costs of uncertainty associated with litigating rates de novo.153 
This new, more deferential approach to ratemaking cases is 
instructive for implementing a positive right to public utilities. When 
courts cannot effectively review cases involving violations of positive 
rights because they lack institutional competence, the positive right is 
too weak to further interests in equity and sustainability.154 
B. Positive Rights to Public Utilities and Sustainability 
Under ordinary formulations, the object of a positive right to 
public utilities is to provide equitable access to water, energy, and 
sanitation without jeopardizing the ability of future generations to 
 
Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920). 
 149.  Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 515–16 (1898); see also Jim Chen, The Second Coming of 
Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1552–54 (1999). 
 150.  Ben Avon, 253 U.S. at 289; see also Leslie A. Glick, Independent Judicial Review of 
Rate Making: The Rise and Demise of the Ben Avon Doctrine, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 305, 305 
(1971). 
 151.  BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CASEBOOK 872 (1994); see also E.F. 
Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the Federal Supreme Court, 35 
HARV. L. REV. 127, 139 (1921). 
 152.  Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (in which the 
Supreme Court did not review constitutional facts de novo in a confiscatory ratemaking case, 
instead deferring to the agencies’ ratemaking methods so long as the rate itself is reasonable.); 
see also Glick, supra note 150, at 307–08 (discussing the split among courts over the continued 
viability of the Ben Avon doctrine). 
 153.  Glick, supra note 150, at 306; see also Schiller, supra note 152, at 431. 
 154.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2191. 
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enjoy that same access.155 In other words, positive rights to public 
utilities aim to achieve both intra-generational equity (the ability of 
the poor to afford sufficient access to adequate public utilities 
services) and inter-generational equity (the ability of future 
generations to enjoy services on those same terms).156 In practice, 
however, applying positive rights to public utilities may actually 
frustrate efforts to achieve intra-generational and inter-generational 
equity in the provision of water, sanitation, and energy. 
Capital-intensive natural monopolies require a return on 
investment to attract capital and expertise, but also to promote 
maintenance and upgrades for degrading or obsolete infrastructure.157  
However, a positive rights approach to public utilities often results in 
large general subsidies to these utilities and underpriced service 
because the right is interpreted or implemented as requiring low or 
no cost provision of at least some amount of utilities service to all.158  
When regulators set low rates to meet a positive right guarantee of 
public utilities, the lack of full cost recovery precludes effective 
maintenance and reinvestment in infrastructure.159  In effect, positive 
rights to public utilities tend to be economically unsustainable. 
Positive rights to public utilities are often formulated in a way 
that either ignores, or is hostile to the idea that water and energy are 
valuable commodities requiring expensive infrastructure to fully 
develop.160 For example, some have argued that full cost recovery is 
 
 155.  See Craig A. Arnold, Water Privatization in the United States: Human Rights, National 
Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 785, 790 (2009) 
(describing six duties in a rights based approach, including duties of equity and sustainability). 
 156.  See generally Edith Brown-Weiss, The Plantary Trust: Conservation and 
Intergenerational Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495, 558 (1984). 
 157.  Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944); see also Roger 
D. Colton, Prudence, Planning and Principles Ratemaking – A Reply to Professor Schwartz, 35 
HASTINGS L.J. 723, 734–35 (1984). 
 158.  Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 940–41; see also MICHAEL J. ROUSE, 
INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF WATER SERVICES: THE ESSENTIAL 
ELEMENTS 38, 40–47 (2013) (outlining the planning, financing and cost recovery considerations 
inherent in the provision of water services). Of course, water is often underpriced and policies 
fail to achieve full cost recovery in many instances even without a recognized positive right to 
water. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and 
Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671, 674 (1993). 
 159.  Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 940–41; see also Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, 
Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1873, 1882–84 (2005). 
 160. See Int’l Conference on Water and the Env’t, Dublin, Ir., Jan. 26-31, 1992, The Dublin 
Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, princ. 4, U.N. Doc. A/COMF.151/PC112 
[hereinafter, “The Dublin Statement”] available at http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/hwrp/ 
documents/english/icwedece.htmlat 4 (noting inefficient use of water and pointing out that the 
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inconsistent with the idea of positive rights.161 They argue that 
“[i]nstead of commodifying [public utilities] even further, we need to 
recover [utilities] by treating [them] as part of the commons and by 
strengthening community participation in [utilities] management.”162 
Such a formulation of the positive right to public utilities is 
counterproductive for three major reasons. First, many countries are 
reluctant to recognize any positive right to public utilities because 
they are concerned that a “[positive right] may mean free 
provision . . . which they simply cannot afford” without recovering 
costs from consumers.163 As such, formulations of a positive right 
hostile to cost recovery often discourage states from applying a rights 
framework to their public utilities because they are understandably 
reluctant to assume obligations they are unable to meet.164 
Second, where a positive right to public utilities requires 
provision of water, energy, and sanitation at low or no cost, lack of 
cost recovery results in degraded infrastructure and, ultimately, 
inadequate delivery.165 There is a relationship between the “economic 
sustainability” of public utility services and the “recovery of costs 
through . . . [consumer] tariffs that are equitably assigned based on 
 
resource “has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an 
economic good”). “[I]t is vital to recognize . . . the basic right of all human beings to have access 
to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. Past failure to recognize the economic value 
of water has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the resource.” Id. 
 161. See Bluemel, supra note 118, at 963–65 (explaining how “[t]reating water as an 
economic good without limitation as is done under the principle of full cost recovery can lead to 
inequities”). 
 162. MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD: THE FIGHT TO STOP THE 
CORPORATE THEFT OF THE WORLD’S WATER 210 (2002); see also VANDANA SHIVA, WATER 
WARS: PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION AND PROFIT ix–x (2002) (classifying a contemporary 
“clash of . . . two water cultures” as between “a culture that sees water as sacred and treats its 
provision as a duty for the preservation of life and another that sees water as a commodity, and 
its ownership and trade as fundamental corporate rights”). 
 163. See Asit K. Biswas, Water as a Human Right in the MENA Region: Challenges and 
Opportunities, 23 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 209, 215 (2007) (“Since [a provision right 
to water] simply cannot be achieved within the foreseeable future, these countries prefer not to 
recognize this concept until their responsibilities and accountabilities are clarified, as well as 
those of the consumers”). 
 164. See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 105, at 685 (observing that many countries party 
to the ESC Covenant “simply do not have the financial and capacity-related resources to 
implement the items identified as core obligations in relation to the right to water”). 
 165. Cf. James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
94, 115 (2006) (“[T]he fact that the very poor do pay for water, and pay quite a bit in relative 
terms, suggested that they both can and will pay for piped water. Thus the principle of ‘full cost 
recovery’—charging a price to cover costs and profit—has seemed both possible and desirable.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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ability-to-pay.”166 The challenges faced by both India and South 
Africa illustrate how a positive rights approach to public utilities may 
lead to a failure to fully recover costs, ultimately undermining the 
rationales behind a positive right as the degraded system fails to 
deliver what the right promises.167 
Third, where the positive right to public utilities precludes or 
discourages cost recovery, it also discourages much needed 
investment in public utilities infrastructure.168 Billions of dollars are 
needed in the coming years to secure and maintain adequate global 
water and sanitation infrastructure, with the regions most in need 
being least able to absorb those costs.169 Much of the growing 
challenge of global water stress can be attributed to a dramatic 
shortfall in necessary capital to fund improvements in water 
infrastructure.170 The same level of investment in energy infrastructure 
is needed, particularly in light of the need for climate change 
adaptation and mitigation aimed at decreasing greenhouse gas 
emissions.171 It is simply not possible to meaningfully implement a 
positive right to public utilities without dramatic increases in capital 
expenditures in utility infrastructure.172 Such dramatic increases will 
 
 166. Jeffry S. Wade, Privatization and the Future of Water Services, 20 FLA. J. INT’L L. 179, 
195–96 (2008). 
 167.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2220–28. 
 168.  In 2000 the United Nations adopted its “Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs), 
which included the goal “to halve, by the year 2015, . . . the proportion of people who are unable 
to reach or to afford safe drinking water.” G.A. Res. 55/2, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 
18, 2000). In tandem with these “lofty expectations,” the ESC Covenant “places at minimum a 
moral responsibility on wealthy nations and international financial institutions for seeing that 
[the MDGs] are fulfilled.” McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 105, at 685. 
 169.  See Salzman, supra note 165, at 115 (observing in 2006 that the capital investment 
needed for water and sanitation infrastructure approached $100 billion per year over the next 
twenty-five years and that “the weak financial resources of developing country governments 
prevent them from absorbing the costs of water provision upgrades” (citation omitted)). 
 170.  See Thomas M. Kerr, Supplying Water Infrastructure to Developing Countries via 
Private Sector Project Financing, 8 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 94–95 (1995) (explaining how 
“[t]raditional sources of funding for [water] infrastructure have not met the critical needs of 
developing countries”); MICHEL CAMDESSUS, FINANCING WATER FOR ALL 1 (2003) 
[hereinafter CAMDESSUS REPORT], available at http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/ 
world_water_council/ documents_old/Library/Publications_and_reports/CamdessusReport.pdf 
(asserting that water must be treated as an economic good and investment sources tapped more 
efficiently to tackle funding deficits). 
 171.  See generally Frank A. Felder, Climate Change Mitigation and the Global Energy 
System, 25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 89, 94–96 (2014). 
 172.  See Meera Mehta, Thomas Fugelsnes & Kameel Virjee, Financing the Millennium 
Development Goals for Water and Sanitation: What Will It Take?, 21 INT’L J. WATER 
RESOURCES DEV. 239 (2005) (examining whether African countries can meet the MDGs given 
“large funding gaps”). 
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not come unless there is support for effective full cost recovery in the 
public utility sector.173 
Where a positive right is framed as access to resources or services 
“free of economic encumbrances,”174 such a right is counterproductive 
to the development, provision, and expansion of affordable public 
utilities.175 Again, the debate surrounding the human right to water is 
illustrative of the problem for all public utilities. The recent World 
Water Commission strongly advocated full cost pricing of water 
services, noting that “the single most immediate and important 
measure that we can recommend is the systematic adoption of full 
cost pricing for water services.”176 The concern, of course, is what 
impact full cost pricing of water will have on the poor in developing 
countries.177 
The poor in developing countries often pay up to twenty-five 
times more for water from private water vendors than those who have 
access to a regular tap supply.178 The charges imposed by water 
vendors are not only evidence of the inequity resulting from certain 
water policies, but are also evidence that expanding access to tapped 
 
 173.  See id., at 239–40 (arguing that African countries “will need to implement cost 
recovery policies” in attempting to reach the MDGs); CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 170, at 
13 (“Sustainable financing for water systems will require greatly improved cost recovery from 
their users and increased management efficiency.”). Water infrastructure is uniquely capital 
intensive. In the United States, “the ratio of capital investment to revenue is twice as high in 
water as in natural gas, and 70% higher than electricity and telecommunications.” Id. 
 174.  See Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a 
Human Right and the Duties and Obligations it Creates, 4 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 331, 349 
(2005) (describing the “basic premise” of General Comment 15 as providing an unqualified 
right to water). 
 175.  See New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2225 (referring to the counterproductivity to 
the development and expansion of affordable clean water supplies). 
 176.  WORLD WATER COMM., A WATER SECURE WORLD 33 (2000); see also Peter Rogers, 
Radhika de Silva & Ramesh Bhatia, Water is an Economic Good: How to Use Prices to Promote 
Equity, Efficiency, and Sustainability, 4 WATER POL’Y 1, 1–17 (2002) (“We argue in this paper 
that the conventional wisdom is incorrect—increasing prices can improve equity. Higher water 
rates allow utilities to extend services to those currently not served and those currently forced to 
purchase water from vendors at very high prices”). 
 177.  See Shelley Ross Saxer, The Fluid Nature of Property Rights in Water, 21 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 49, 109–10 (2010) (observing that some developing countries fear that 
expanded privatization of water infrastructure with the aid of foreign corporations would 
subject the “poor . . . [to] high prices and service cut-offs” (citation omitted)). 
 178. ROUSE, supra note 158217, at 16, 47; see also Sudhirendar Sharma, Watermarkets 
Exclude the Poor, in THE VALUE OF NATURE: ECOLOGICAL POLITICS IN INDIA 141,145 (Smitu 
Kothari, Imtiaz Ahmad & Helmut Reifeld eds., 2003) (“World Bank sponsored studies indicate 
that urban poor already pay five times the municipal rate for water in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire; 25 
times more in Dhaka, Bangladesh; and 40 times more in Cairo, Egypt.”). 
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and treated water can reduce the poor’s expenditures on water.179 
However, such expansion requires significant investment in 
infrastructure. When infrastructure goes unfunded because of a 
failure to recover costs, delivery becomes inconsistent, quality 
decreases, and the ones who suffer most are the poor.180 Where a 
positive right to public utilities is framed in such a way as to interfere 
with full cost recovery, the right is counterproductive to its presumed 
end of protecting the economically disadvantaged.181 
Guaranteeing affordability through a positive right can interfere 
with essential full cost recovery, resulting in a regressive policy that 
ultimately harms the poor and frustrates efforts to achieve inter-
generational equity.182 When the positive right to public utilities 
eliminates incentives to conserve, it not only harms the poor in the 
present, but future generations as well.183 Low rates and large 
subsidies prevent consumers from internalizing the costs of their 
consumption of resources provided through public utilities, leading to 
waste and unsustainable use.184 Appropriate utility service pricing, on 
the other hand, encourages sustainable use.185 Thus, reasonable water 
pricing is essential to water sustainability.186 Free or heavily subsidized 
water services lead to waste of water resources with implications for 
inter-generational equity and the environment because water is 
withdrawn faster than it is naturally restored.187 
 
 179.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2226. 
 180. See ARTHUR C. MCINTOSH, ASIAN WATER SUPPLIES: REACHING THE URBAN POOR 
35 (2003) (“Water and poverty are linked by private operators with concessions promising to 
bring investment funds to the table to improve coverage, which they have not done, and water 
and poverty are linked by the poor suffering as a consequence.”). 
 181.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2226. 
 182.  Id. at 2231. 
 183. Id. at 2231–33; see generally Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environmental 
Law and Future Generations, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 289 (2003). 
 184.  ROUSE, supra note 158, at 40–43. 
 185.  See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 170, at 18 (arguing that “full cost recovery from 
users is the ideal long-term aim”); Priceless, THE ECONOMIST (July 17, 2003), 
http://www.economist.com/node/1906846 (noting that the colossal underpricing of water leads to 
overuse and waste, and contending that sensible water pricing, reflecting actual costs of 
treatment and transport, would correct the challenge of water conservation). 
 186. Marwaan Macan-Markar, World Bank Backs Privatizing Water, Critics Dismayed, 
INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 17, 2003. 
 187. See NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER KENT, PERVERSE SUBSIDIES: HOW TAX DOLLARS 
CAN UNDERCUT THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY, (2001), at 123–31 (describing how 
water shortages and a lack of clean water in developing countries lead to deaths from water-
related diseases, economic harm because of the time that people take  each day  to find water, 
and environmental damage through the drainage of wetlands and the depletion of fish stocks); 
Glennon, supra note 159, at 1883 (encouraging a reform of the present system by eliminating 
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There is a growing awareness that large general subsidies 
produce waste that is not ecologically sustainable, particularly in 
resource-scarce regions, and that general subsidies in energy and 
water are harmful in the long run to the environment.188 General 
subsidies have been particularly linked to severe environmental 
damage in developing countries.189 Low cost or free water, promoted 
under the auspices of a positive right, thus has led to the depletion of 
water supplies for people and the environment, as well as an overall 
degradation of water quality.190 
The same problem of waste from large subsidies arises in the 
energy sector.191 If the positive right to public utilities results in large 
subsidies to the energy sector, then energy consumers will have little 
incentive to conserve energy, thus aggravating greenhouse gas 
emissions and the sustainability issues surrounding global climate 
change.192 The basis for many of the policy proposals that seek to 
mitigate climate change – such as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade 
schemes – is cost internalization to promote conservation and 
renewable energy.193 And where these approaches fail, a more 
 
subsidies as a strategy that “would gain people’s attention about their water use through their 
pocketbooks” and noting that water prices are “ridiculously low”). 
 188.  See Peter P. Rogers, Water Governance, Water Security and Water Sustainability, in 
WATER CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY? 3, 4–10 (Peter P. Rogers et al. eds., 2006) (discussing water 
sustainability issues). 
 189.  See David L. Feldman & Helen Ingram, Multiple Ways of Knowing Water Resources: 
Enhancing the Status of Water Ethics, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2009) (noting that 
ecologists see water subsidies as damaging to the environment). This focus on low-cost water 
demonstrates another inherent problem of any “human rights” approach to water policy, but 
particularly the positive human rights approach’s emphasis on cheap or free water—its inherent 
“humanness.” 
 190.  See Sharad K. Jain, Anupma Sharma & Rakesh Kumar, Freshwater and Its 
Management in India, 2 INT’L J. RIVER BASIN MGMT. 259, 263–64 (2004) (explaining that large-
scale extraction of groundwater in India has led to overdraft and a fall in the water table); J.M. 
Sharp, Jr. et al., Effects of Urbanization on Groundwater Systems, in EARTH SCIENCE IN THE 
CITY: A READER 262–63 (Grant Heiken et al. eds., 2003) (explaining that due to the increased 
pumping, an aquifer in Texas is no longer able to maintain two major springs that are needed to 
“ensure the survival of several species of flora and fauna that only exist” in that area). 
 191.  John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance, 
49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 67–68 (1998). 
 192.  See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be 
Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51, 76 (2009) (“[A]ny tax or cap-and-trade 
system that requires firm or individuals to internalize the social cost of their greenhouse gas 
emissions is efficient, in the sense that under these schemes firms and individuals will use energy 
only when the social benefits (including their own profits or consumption) are greater than the 
social costs (including the costs to the climate).”). 
 193.  See, e.g., Joshua Meltzer, A Carbon Tax as a Driver of Green Technology Innovation 
and the Implications for International Trade, 35 ENERGY L.J. 45, 52 (2014) (arguing that these 
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localized approach where regulators set utility rates to encourage 
conservation could be an alternative path to mitigating climate 
change.194 
Thus, to the extent that a positive right to energy produces 
energy subsidies that preclude cost internalization and conservation 
incentives, the positive right to energy could aggravate the 
sustainability challenges associated with global climate change. In 
short, where the positive right to public utilities fails to recover costs 
of service, it is economically unsustainable and intra-generationally 
inequitable. When the positive right is implemented so that 
consumers do not internalize the cost of consumption, the right is 
likewise ecologically unsustainable and inter-generationally 
inequitable. The anthropocentric focus on low- or no-cost public 
utilities services therefore raises serious concerns as to the 
sustainability of a positive right to public utilities.195 
C. Positive Rights to Public Utilities and Transparency 
The possible inequities arising from the positive right to public 
utilities are not limited just to concerns of cost recovery and cost 
internalization. The way in which public utilities are managed and 
regulated as natural monopolies often impedes effective 
implementation of a positive right.  Regulators who set rates and 
grant concessions to utility companies may be politically motivated to 
set low rates to satisfy the demands of their constituency for low cost 
water and energy, with the positive right serving as the legal excuse 
for setting low rates.196  As such, a positive right may result in 
undervaluing public utility services in the name of political 
expediency.197 Once constituents are satisfied with free or low-cost 
utility services provided in the name of a positive right, there is little 
 
policies misperceive “the balance between achieving environmental goals and minimizing 
economic costs.”). 
 194.  Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for Us: The Financial 
Disincentive for Net Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1554 (2012). 
 195.  See Leonard Hammer, Indigenous Peoples as a Catalyst for Applying the Human Right 
to Water, 10 INT’L J. MINORITY & GRP RTS. 131, 134 (2003) (arguing that the human right to 
water as contemplated by General Comment 15 “seems to adopt an anthropocentric model, 
whereby the environment exists to serve the basic needs of human beings.”). 
 196.  See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and 
the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1027 (1988) (discussing this phenomenon in the 
context of the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act). 
 197.  Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. MacKerron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal 
Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719 n.241 (1985). 
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incentive for the public to provide any oversight of utility 
companies198 Therefore, a need arises for transparency. 
In fact, public oversight of utility companies is critical.199 Utility 
companies frequently secure grants of a natural monopoly through 
concession contracts between the company and the state.200 These 
contracts set forth the scope of the natural monopoly – how long the 
company will hold the monopoly and over what geographic areas – as 
well as the mechanisms for financing, cost recovery, and government 
oversight.201 Both utility companies and regulators are likely to be 
motivated by self-interest, and may therefore engage in corrupt 
concession contracting processes.202 In those instances, a positive right 
to public utilities could serve as the legal excuse for rent-seeking 
regulators and public utilities companies to secure long-term 
concessions and guaranteed public subsidization.203 Corruption in the 
concession contracting process thus has the potential to undermine 
positive rights to public utilities because it can guarantee large 
subsidies to private utility companies while the public remains 
rationally disengaged from the concession contract due to the 
affordable services that the positive right ensures.204 As long as the 
public is not fully internalizing the cost of its utility consumption, it is 
unlikely to demand transparency and accountability in the concession 
contracting process. 
Such a lack of transparency and accountability in concession 
contracting can have enormously detrimental impacts on the public.205 
 
 198. See Vandenbergh, supra note 194, at 1533–34 (observing that consumers’ short-term 
interests are satisfied as long as utilities are low-priced). 
 199.  See, e.g., William H. Ellerbe, Toward Legitimacy Through Collaborative Governance: 
An Analysis of the Effect of South Carolina’s Office of Regulatory Staff on Public Utility 
Regulation, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 219 (2011). 
 200.  PETER VINCENT-JONES, THE NEW PUBLIC CONTRACTING: REGULATION, 
RESPONSIVENESS, RELATIONALITY 141–43 (2006). 
 201.  JOSÉ A. GOMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS, 
AND DISCRETION 84–91 (2009). 
 202.  See generally Charles Kenny & Tina Soreide, Grand Corruption in Utilities, (WORLD 
BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 4805 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1327274 (identifying corruption as one 
potential reason why privatized utility services haven’t performed well in low- and middle-
income countries). 
 203.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2189. 
 204.  See, e.g., Wilford A. Payne, III, The Regulatory Pitfalls of Distributive Generation: No 
Standardization in Access or Standby Rate Structures, 2 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 61, 65 (2001) 
(noting how some energy utility companies have used regulations to prohibit distributed power 
facilities). 
 205.  See, e.g., Emmanuelle Auriol & Aymeric Blanc, Capture and Corruption in Public 
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For example, corrupt officials may grant a public utility concession 
without any competitive bidding process, effectively eliminating one 
of the few instances where competition can drive down costs and 
improve a natural monopoly’s efficiency and performance.206 Corrupt 
officials can further eliminate the role of competition by prohibiting 
any alternative means of distributing water, sanitation, or energy 
services.207 For instance, the state can force more customers to the 
private utility company by outlawing or increasing the cost of 
distributed energy sources, such as solar or wind, distributed water 
sources, like wells and rainwater harvesting, or distributed sanitation, 
such as latrines. 
The Bolivian Water War of 2000 illustrates the challenges 
associated with concession contracts and the positive right to public 
utilities. The City of Cochabamba in Bolivia was suffering from 
severe water supply, quality, and infrastructure problems at the 
time.208 Only a small percentage of the City was connected to the 
water system, with many forced to find alternative water supplies at 
high cost or high risk.209 To secure necessary loans to improve water 
services, the City, at the encouragement of the World Bank, 
privatized its water supply and infrastructure.210 The concession 
contract was awarded to a consortium led by Bechtel, called Aguas 
Del Tunari (ADT), without any competitive bid or public stakeholder 
involvement, and guaranteed 16% return on investment to ADT for 
40 years.211 The guaranteed rate of return resulted in a rate increase of 
35%, with some water bills rising as much as 200%.212 In part to 
guarantee sufficient customers, and in part to encourage connection 
 
Utilities: The Cases of Water and Electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa, 17 UTIL. POL’Y 203 (2009) 
(tracing the issue of high-priced, privatized service utilities to local corruption). 
 206.  OSCAR OLIVERA & TOM LEWIS, ¡COCHABAMBA! WATER WAR IN BOLIVIA 5 (2004). 
 207.  Id. at 9. 
 208. See id. at 7–8 (explaining the city’s historical problems with water and water supply). 
 209. See id. at 8–9 (explaining the way Cochabamba’s residents received water at the time 
the government privatized the water utility). 
 210. See Private Passions, THE ECONOMIST (July 17, 2003), 
http://www.economist.com/node/1906828 (discussing the water infrastructure projects the 
Bolivian government desired to accomplish through privatizing the utility); Kristin Komives, 
Designing Pro-Poor Water and Sewer Concessions: Early Lessons from Bolivia 1 (World Bank, 
Working Paper No. 2243, 1999), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=629179 
(explaining that governments of developing countries often turn to privatization to fund 
infrastructure improvements). 
 211. See Andrew Nickson & Claudia Vargas, The Limitations of Water Regulation: The 
Failure of the Cochabamba Concession in Bolivia, 21 BULL. LATIN AM. RES. 99, 105–112 (2002) 
(detailing the nature and effects of the Bolivian concession contract for water provision). 
 212.  Id. 
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to a clean drinking water system, alternative (and in some cases, 
traditional) methods of gathering water were prohibited, including 
rainwater harvesting.213 
The public response to Cochabamba’s prohibition on alternative 
water sourcing and increased water rates quickly escalated into large-
scale protests of the concession contract.214 Protestors claimed that the 
concession to ADT, and the related rate increases and associated 
prohibition on alternative water provision, violated a fundamental 
human right to water.215 After a prolonged and violent standoff, the 
protestors and the government reached an accord which nullified the 
concession contract, repealed prohibitions on alternative water 
provision, and turned over ownership and operation of the city’s 
water services to the municipal government.216 Yet despite these 
reforms, water quality and services in Cochabamba today remain 
problematic, with more than half of the city’s population unconnected 
to services.217 
The Cochabama example demonstrates an ineffective approach 
to providing water. A potential solution to problems illustrated in 
Cochabamba could involve a state government guarantee of water 
and energy to its citizens at a certain price. That positive right would 
then provide the legal requirement for large general subsidies 
directed at private utility companies building and operating the 
 
 213.  OLIVERA, supra note 206, at 8. 
 214. See id. at 33–49 (detailing the standoff and conflict that eventually lead to water 
management in Cochabamba being entrusted to the municipal government). 
 215.  Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 966–67 (2004). 
 216. Id. Cochabamba claimed that ADT had abandoned the city and thus voided the 
contract as the grounds for nullifying the concession contract. See Timothy O’Neill, Note, Water 
and Freedom: The Privatization of Water and its Implications for Democracy and Human Rights 
in the Developing World, 17 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 357, 370–71 (2005–2006) 
(describing the events leading up to the rescission of the water contract between the Bolivian 
government and ADT). ADT brought a claim against the government of Bolivia in the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), claiming breach of the 
concession contract and violation of international law. See Amanda L. Norris & Katina E. 
Metzidakis, Public Protests, Private Contracts: Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitration and the 
Cochabamba Water War, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 30, 42 (2010) (providing an account of 
ADT’s actions after water services in Cochabamba were turned back over to the municipal 
government). 
 217. See Juan Forero, Bolivia Regrets IMF Experiment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/14/business/worldbusiness/14iht-water.html?pagewanted= 
all&_r=0 (“[H]alf of the 600,000 people in Cochabamba remain without water, and those who 
do have service have it only intermittently, some as little as three hours a day.”); ROUSE, supra 
note 158, at 141–42 (2007) (detailing the state of Cochabamba’s water supply after the failed 
attempt at privatization). 
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infrastructure.218 In the name of securing positive rights to public 
utilities, alternative approaches to water, sanitation, or energy 
provision could be prohibited. Corrupt officials could further 
eliminate competition by avoiding a competitive bidding process for 
the concession. The public choice theory explanation for this 
approach is that utility companies will encourage positive rights as a 
means of limiting competition while also guaranteeing large general 
subsidies.219 Citizens would be unlikely to oppose those general 
subsidies, even if corrupt and unsustainable, both because they are 
receiving free or underpriced utilities services, and also because 
collective action problems and rational ignorance effectively preclude 
public opposition.220 
Even where there is no corruption or rent-seeking in the 
concession contracting process, the politics of public utility regulation 
under a positive rights regime remains problematic.  The public is less 
likely to engage with the development of water policy when it is not 
impacted by water rates, making water policy development less 
transparent and less participatory.221 This situation – where consumers 
fail to provide adequate oversight of the provision of goods and 
services because they are receiving those goods and services at low 
cost – is analogous to health insurance and health care in that health 
care consumers often fail to stay informed regarding costs and 
effectiveness of treatment because the majority of the actual cost is 
borne by the insurance company.222 This rational indifference or 
rational ignorance limits transparency because consumers do not seek 
information on efficiency and effectiveness when the cost of obtaining 
 
 218.  See generally Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Corruption, Legitimacy and Human Rights: The 
Dialectic of the Relationship, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 495 (1999) (comparing and contrasting the 
discourses of corruption and human rights). 
 219.  See generally B. Delworth Gardner, Water Pricing and Rent Seeking in California 
Agriculture, in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 45 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983); Randal Rucker & Price Fishback, The 
Federal Reclamation Program: An Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior, in WATER RIGHTS: 
SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 83 (Terry L. 
Anderson ed., 1983). 
 220.  See generally Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and 
Modern Economic Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CAL. L. REV. 943 (2009) (arguing that 
narrow economic formalism is inappropriately used in courts). 
 221.  See Vandenbergh, supra note 201, at 1531–34 (observing that consumers’ short-term 
interests are satisfied as long as utilities are low-priced, even if the long-term costs of 
inefficiency are ultimately greater). 
 222.  Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating to Promote Competition in Designing Health Insurance 
Exchanges, 20 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 242 (2011). 
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the information exceeds the cost of obtaining an acceptable level of 
effectiveness.223 Similarly, water and energy consumers receiving no or 
low-cost services will not invest time in providing necessary public 
oversight of, and stakeholder participation in, public utility 
regulation. 
The example of Bolivia illustrates that it is not essential to enact 
a positive right to public utilities in order for public corruption to 
infiltrate concession contracting. Even so, a positive right can provide 
the legal foundation for such corruption, and can limit the 
stakeholder engagement necessary for appropriate oversight of an 
otherwise monopolistic regime. This is true particularly when the 
sustainability of scarce and essential resources is at stake. Thus, the 
absence of a positive right to public utilities is preferable to 
unenforceable and inequitable rights which facilitate public 
corruption. While the aims of positive rights to public utilities may be 
laudable, ultimately, positive rights must be evaluated for their 
pragmatic utility.224 Without a pragmatic orientation, positive rights 
“are grounded in nothing more than an altruistic desire to take a 
symbolic action without regard for the interests of the very 
beneficiaries they purport to benefit,” and reflect only “the 
conscience of the more privileged.”225 If enforceability, sustainability, 
and equity are the aims of the positive rights approach to public 
utilities, then such rights must be framed and implemented with those 
aims in mind. 
III. HOW TO ADAPT POSITIVE RIGHTS TO PUBLIC UTILITIES 
The characteristics of public utilities make implementation of a 
positive right difficult, but not impossible. In order to effectively 
implement a positive right, such a right must be tailored to the public 
utility, while keeping in mind the aims of enforceability, transparency, 
and sustainability. This Part proposes three ways to adapt the 
implementation of a positive right to the unique characteristics of 
public utilities: (A) creation of specialized tribunals; (B) a tariff 
 
 223.  Id.; see also Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived 
Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 771 (1993) (“Rational consumers will invest 
only up to the point at which the marginal cost of additional information equal the marginal 
benefits.”). 
 224.  See Cross, supra note 3, at 878–80 (explaining why the rejection of pragmatism in the 
evaluation of positive rights is flawed). 
 225.  Id.; see also MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973 143 (1993) (noting that litigation strategies are not the best way 
to combat poverty because the lawyers often have only second-hand knowledge of the issues). 
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structure where the largest consumers pay the highest rates; and (C) a 
transparent and participatory public concession contracting process. 
A. Specialized Tribunals for Public Utilities Cases 
Despite the flaws inherent in the current approach, a workable 
version of a positive right to public utilities could prove pivotal in 
successfully achieving equitable global access to water, sanitation, and 
energy.226  However, one of the main obstacles to an enforceable 
positive right to public utilities is the relative lack of expertise of most 
courts in rate-setting, ecology, infrastructure finance, and public 
health relating to public utilities. To address this shortfall in 
institutional competence, states seeking to implement a positive right 
to public utilities should institute specialized tribunals with relevant 
expertise in public utilities to adjudicate these positive rights.227 
A specialized court is one with jurisdiction, typically exclusive, in 
a single legal field.228 The advantage of this approach is that the 
specialization of the court affords it the institutional competence to 
adjudicate within a field that is highly technical and requires a high 
degree of expertise.229 This approach has been taken in the fields of 
bankruptcy, tax, corporate law, and patents.230 More than simply 
providing an informed adjudicator in a complicated dispute, the 
institutional competency of specialized courts also protects the rights 
of the parties from arbitrary action by the executive.231 Where a court 
 
 226. See generally J. Haeusermann, A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT 
(1998). 
 227.  See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67 
(1995) (arguing the virtues of specialized tribunals). 
 228.  Id. at 69; see also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989). 
 229.  Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of 
Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 192 (2003). 
 230.  See, e.g., Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 
84 IND. L.J. 57, 125–26 (2009) (discussing the U.S. Tax Court’s specialized procedures and its 
relative institutional competence); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: 
Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 843 (1999) (noting the institutional 
competence of the Court of Federal Claims in adjudicating intellectual property rights); Richard 
B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring Up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post 
CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85, 100 (1988) (noting the flexibility and specializing of 
bankruptcy courts); John J. Gibbons, The Quality of the Judges is What Counts in the End, 61 
BROOK. L. REV. 45, 46 (1995) (noting the role of specializing in the Delaware Court of 
Chancery). 
 231.  Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive 
Treaty Interpretation, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1763 (2007) (arguing that an overly-deferential 
judiciary driven by concerns of institutional competency can threaten the role of the judiciary 
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reviewing executive action lacks field-specific competence relative to 
the executive agency it reviews, it typically defers to that agency’s 
expertise, as was seen in the South African Constitutional Court’s 
deference to the City in Mazibuko.232 But where the reviewing court 
has sufficient expertise to effectively review the actions of the 
executive de novo, and particularly where those actions affect 
fundamental constitutional rights, the court is more likely to provide 
an effective bulwark against executive overreach.233 
The use of specialized tribunals in deciding cases involving 
natural resources is not without precedent. The U.S. Supreme Court 
often relies on special masters in cases involving inter-state water 
disputes precisely because of their institutional competence.234 Special 
masters play important roles in large general stream adjudications 
because of the high level of complexity, typically involving thousands 
of parties and technical evaluations of hydrologic models.235 Similarly, 
the State of Colorado relies on special water courts to adjudicate 
water disputes, recognizing that expertise is necessary to effectively 
adjudicate disputes involving water rights priority, water efficiency, 
and the reasonableness of water uses.236 Evaluations of Colorado’s 
system have commended it for its fairness, adaptability, and 
 
plays in checking the power of the executive). 
 232.  Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 6–7 paras.11–12, 179 (S. 
Afr.); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that where 
Congress has not spoken unambiguously in a statute, courts should defer to agency 
interpretations of statutes implemented by that agency unless the interpretation is 
unreasonable). 
 233.  See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–15 (2005) (holding that strict 
scrutiny, rather than deference, was appropriate in reviewing claims involving Constitutional 
rights); see also Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law 
Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2032 (2011) (arguing that 
judicial deference to executive agencies in cases involving individual constitutional rights is 
“inconsistent and inchoate” in part because the relative expertise of the courts vis a vis the 
agency in such cases allows for a more searching review). 
 234.  See generally Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special 
Masters, 43 EMORY L.J. 927, 950 (1994) (noting the role of expertise in appointing special 
masters in water cases); see also Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial 
Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 
625 (2002) (noting the role of special masters in interstate disputes). 
 235.  Farrell, supra note 234, at 953; see also David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of 
Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States’ Role?, 20 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 32 (2001) (noting the role of special masters in Wyoming general stream 
adjudications). 
 236.  Tom I. Romero, Uncertain Waters and Contested Lands: Excavating the Layers of 
Colorado’s Legal Past, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 540 (2002) (discussing the historical 
development of Colorado’s special water courts). 
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particularly for the high levels of expertise held by the judges.237 This 
success has led to calls for a similar approach in the adjudication of 
other disputes involving natural resources.238 
The challenge of implementing this reform can be the higher cost 
of such specialized courts.239 However, procedural reforms can reduce 
costs to provide for efficient adjudication.240 Such reforms include 
disclosures that must be held in a publicly accessible database, limits 
on the participation of third parties not directly involved in the 
dispute, and cost-sharing and fee structures directed at lowering the 
cost of expert engineers and economists as witnesses and 
consultants.241 The higher cost potential of specialized courts has not 
precluded implementation of this approach in tax, bankruptcy, and 
intellectual property,242 and it should not prove any greater an 
obstacle in the equally important realm of public utility regulation. 
These specialized tribunals should review agency decisions 
impacting the positive right to public utilities de novo, with authority 
to award damages and issue equitable and declaratory relief. 
Critically, a positive right to public utilities should incorporate 
stakeholder rights to participate in the formulation of water, 
sanitation, and energy policies that are similarly enforceable by 
specialized tribunals.243 The courts should be independent of the 
executive, and provide oversight of agency adjudication of utility 
disputes. By establishing specialized courts, the positive right to 
public utilities will cease to be  a mere aspirational statement for 
executive agencies avoiding effective judicial review through their 
relative institutional competence; instead, it will be a right that can be 
 
 237.  Id. at 547–49. 
 238.  See, e.g., Barbara Cosens, Resolving Conflict in Non-Ideal, Complex Systems: Solutions 
for the Law-Science Breakdown in Environmental and Natural Resource Law, 48 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 257, 297 (2008) (noting certain aspects of the Colorado water court system 
function as a useful template for resolving certain environmental and natural resource cases). 
 239.  David M. Getches, foreword to P. ANDREW JONES & TOM CECH, COLORADO WATER 
LAW FOR NON-LAWYERS x (Univ. Press of Colo. 2009) (finding the costs associated with 
specialized water courts in Colorado “troubling.”). 
 240.  Charles W. Howe, Reconciling Water Law and Economic Efficiency in Colorado Water 
Administration, 16 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 37, 39-40 (2013) (proposing reforms to enhance 
the efficiency of the Colorado water courts system). 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329 
(1991); Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519 (2008). 
 243.  New Right in Water, supra note 4 (arguing for participation rights in water 
guaranteeing access to stakeholder processes relating to rate-setting, access, quality, and 
financing). 
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enforced by judges capable of balancing economic, financial, ecologic, 
and public health interests. 
B. Block Tariffs and Direct Subsidies in Public Utilities 
A specialized tribunal is an important step in transitioning a 
positive right in public utilities from aspirational to functional in that 
it avoids the obstacle of institutional competence that has often 
precluded effective judicial enforcement of positive rights. It does 
not, however, address the issues of intra-generational equity and 
sustainability. The implementation of a positive right to public 
utilities must not only result in affordable water, sanitation, and 
electricity services to the poor in the present, it must also recover 
costs to maintain and upgrade infrastructure and encourage 
conservation of resources. To balance these potentially competing 
aims, the implementation of the positive right to public utilities must 
be coupled with tariff reform. 
The first reform that must be adopted are block tariffs – utility 
rates that increase as consumption increases.244 Block tariffs can be 
effective in ensuring access to a minimum amount of water at an 
affordable price, while still achieving full cost recovery.245 The largest 
consumers of water, energy, and sanitation would bear the greatest 
burden of ensuring cost recovery, and have a correspondingly greater 
incentive for conservation.246 At the other end, indigent consumers 
who require only enough public utility service to meet a minimum 
standard of living would pay the lowest rate.247 
This approach alone, however, still leaves open the question of 
whether that low initial block rate would be affordable to all, and 
whether everyone would still have incentives to conserve resources by 
internalizing the cost of consumption. Without additional reforms, the 
block tariff approach leaves unanswered questions of how much 
water and energy domestic users will receive in the initial, low-priced 
block.248 The block tariff approach should therefore be coupled with 
 
 244.  Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 951; see also ROUSE, supra note 158, at 45–47. 
 245.  ROUSE, supra note 158 at 64–66; see also Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right to 
Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning and the Controversy over Privatization, 3 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 89, 134 (2013). 
 246.  Glennon, supra note 159 at 1883–84. 
 247.  Id.; see also Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 950–51. 
 248.  See generally John J. Boland & Dale Whittington, Water Tariff Design in Developing 
Countries: Disadvantages of Increasing Block Tariffs (IBTs) and Advantages of Uniform Price 
with Rebate (UPR) Designed, International Development and Research Centre (2000), 
http://www.efdinitiative.org/sites/default/files/071f_water20tariff20design.pdf 
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direct public utility subsidies to indigent consumers based on their 
ability to pay.249 
This is the approach Chile has taken with water provision, and it 
can be adapted for public utility services in general.250 In 1998, Chile 
enacted a new Tariff Law to encourage full cost recovery and 
equitable pricing.251 Central to the new Tariff Law was a direct 
subsidy to poor households.252 These households would go to their 
local government, which would make an ability-to-pay 
determination.253 The household would be required to pay what it 
could afford based on the amount of its consumption (thereby 
internalizing at least some of the cost of consumption and having an 
incentive to conserve).254 The local government would then provide a 
direct subsidy in the form of a “water stamp” to cover the rest of the 
cost of water provision.255 
Block tariffs alone can disproportionately burden poor 
households because water vendors may buy water in bulk from the 
public utility at the higher rate, and then pass the cost on to the poor, 
who rely most on water vendors in developing countries.256 Increasing 
block rates may also prevent firms from reaching the economies of 
scale needed to benefit poorer consumers (by preventing farm 
consolidation or larger-scale industrialization of energy and water 
resource development).257  As with many of the challenges and 
opportunities associated with positive rights to public utilities, this 
issue would likely arise more in urban areas of large developing 
countries, where the cross-subsidy to poor consumers will require 
greater distortion of the rate structure due to the larger numbers of 
economically disadvantaged citizens. Additionally, wealthier 
households and businesses are more able to bear the cost of water-
 
 249.  See Jessica Budds & Gordon McGranahan, Are the Debates on Water Privatization 
Missing the Point? Experiences from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 15 ENV’T & 
URBANIZATION 87, 109 (2003) (discussing the water voucher system in Chile). 
 250.  ROUSE, supra note 158, at 209–12. 
 251.  Id. at 210–11. 
 252.   See generally Pablo Serra, Subsidies in Chilean Public Utilities, Body of Knowledge on 
Infrastructure Regulation, regulationbodyofknowledge.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ 
Serra_Subsidies_in_Chilean.pdf (arguing Chile designed subsidies targeted to the poor at a 
relatively low cost to the State). 
 253.   Id. 
 254.   Id. 
 255.  See James Salzman, supra note 165, at 118 n.167. 
 256.  Murthy, supra note 44, at 134. 
 257.  See id. at 133 (stating that the human right to water and sanitation requires states to 
examine their tariff structure because of the effect it can have on the poor). 
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efficient or energy-efficient technologies. By supplementing the block 
tariff approach with the Chilean direct subsidy approach, the poor 
would be able to afford water connections without the need to seek 
out water vendors. 
A similar approach is possible with energy and sanitation. Utility 
companies charge low rates at the first block – below the cost of 
provision – with higher rates charged for higher blocks of 
consumption (up to an amount exceeding the cost of provision). 
Revenues generated from those higher blocks would fund directed 
subsidies at the local level. Those directed subsidies would be 
provided after an ability to pay determination, such that all 
consumers internalize the costs of consumption, both to incentivize 
conservation and to facilitate cost recovery. 
However, this approach has potential pitfalls too. The energy 
and agricultural industries are the largest water consumers,258 and if 
block tariffs make water more affordable for the poor, but the costs 
of increased water rates on energy and agriculture are passed on to 
the poor in the form of higher energy and food prices, then the block 
tariff approach might not ultimately achieve the overall goal of equity 
and affordability. The embedded nature of water and energy – virtual 
water and virtual energy – make it difficult to establish equitable 
pricing of these utility services without any increased block rates 
being reflected in the costs of other goods and services. Ultimately, 
though, the essential roles of water, energy, and sanitation in 
achieving a minimum standard of living argues in favor of addressing 
equitable pricing at the utility level. 
Several counterarguments can be made to the general aim of full 
cost recovery and cost internalization, even for poor consumers of 
public utility services. In particular, many argue that large general 
subsidies allow for payment of public utility services without 
requiring consumers to pay high tariffs.259 These general subsidies 
would be funded from general tax revenues.260 Advocacy for positive 
rights is often coupled with arguments in favor of large general 
subsidies as a means of ensuring expanded access to poor 
communities and avoiding rate increases.261 General subsidies in 
 
 258.  Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 950. 
 259.  See Murthy, supra note 44, at 134 (citing the UNDP’s suggested guideline that no more 
than 3 percent of household income be spent on water or sanitation). 
 260.  Id. at 134; see also John H. Barton, Nuclear Power: The Politics of Security and 
Development, 25 STAN. L. REV. 622, 634 (1973); Reconciling Energy, supra note 5, at 940–41. 
 261.  See Elizabeth Burleson, Emerging Law Addressing Climate Change and Water, 5 
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developing countries are “motivated predominantly by social 
objectives,” including ensuring provision to the poor, under the 
assumption that the poor cannot afford to pay for utility services.262 
The water sector is again illustrative of the problem of direct 
subsidies and positive rights more generally. Currently, cost recovery 
of drinking water services in developing countries averages 35 
percent, with water prices “set at a fraction of the marginal costs of 
supply.”263 The economic burden of underpriced water in developing 
countries is approximately $13 billion per year, with total subsidies 
for drinking water in developing countries exceeding $45 billion per 
year.264 The cost-recovery gap will ultimately harm the poor most. The 
rich will benefit from subsidized utility services, and the poor will be 
left without access, with poor quality, or with higher rates they must 
pay to vendors.265 The ability-to-pay determination, combined with 
utility stamps funded from revenues generated through block tariffs, 
facilitates both cost-internalization for all consumers and full cost 
recovery. At the same time, it also provides affordable public utility 
services without excessive public debt or general subsidies that would 
lead to a lack of consumer cost-internalization. 
C. Effective Concession Contracts for Public Utilities 
The ultimate success or failure of these tariff reforms may 
depend on the degree to which utility companies become partners in 
facilitating a positive right to public utilities. Rates must be set at a 
level high enough not only to achieve cost recovery and conservation 
incentives, but also to attract capital, maintain credit, and retain 
expertise. However, if regulators set rates too high, resulting in 
monopolistic pricing, and then fail to provide adequate oversight, the 
positive right to public utilities will be undermined by poor quality 
and unaffordable rates. And where there is little transparency or 
 
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 489, 496–99 (2010) (advocating for continued public 
participation in water management, including “sensible subsidies”). 
 262.  André de Moor & Cees van Beers, The Perversity of Government Subsidies for Energy 
and Water, in GREENING THE BUDGET: BUDGETARY POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPROVEMENT 24, 32–38 (J. Peter Clinch et. al. eds., 2002). 
 263.  Id. at 36. 
 264.  Id. at 36–37. 
 265.  See id. at 39 (concluding that “[r]eforming current water-pricing practices will . . . 
generate the necessary resources to expand public water services, while governments and 
banking institutions could then provide credit facilities to low-income groups to safeguard an 
easy access to public drinking water”); ROUSE, supra note 158 at 47–49 (offering various 
approaches to improving the valuation of water so as to assist the poor). 
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stakeholder involvement in developing public utility policy, 
corruption may ultimately prove more damaging to the prospects of 
positive rights to public utilities than inadequate pricing or 
institutional incompetence. 
In the case of Cochabamba, bad public utility services were made 
worse by a bad concession contract, which itself was replaced by 
further bad public utility services.266 The failed attempt to improve 
water utility services in Cochabamba is a cautionary tale for any state 
attempting to implement a positive right to public utilities. It 
demonstrates how inadequate concession contracting processes can 
interfere with attempts to improve public utility services. Any right to 
public utilities will ultimately prove counter-productive if it is not 
enforceable, equitable, and sustainable. But effective oversight and 
enforcement by a specialized judiciary will be meaningless if the 
concession contract makes other enforceable guarantees that 
preclude the provision of equitable and sustainable public utilities. 
And achieving equitable pricing and cost-internalization will be 
impossible if the concession contract establishes a rate of return that 
allows monopolistic pricing. As such, specialized public utility courts 
and tariff reforms must be combined with a fair, transparent, and 
participatory public concession contracting process. That process 
must be overseen by the public utility court, which would have 
authority to grant relief for procedural and substantive violations of 
concession contracting requirements established by statute. 
The process failed in Cochabamba because of a lack of 
transparency, legitimacy, and oversight. Effective government 
oversight requires the state to ensure that the concession contract 
process attracts acceptable potential utility partners. The size of the 
concession must be large enough to attract good management and 
achieve economies of scale.267 This may require coordination of 
multiple consecutive systems, and the use of technology to integrate 
those systems, which should be anticipated in the solicitation of bids 
for the concession contract.268 The concession contract period should 
 
 266.  See generally Nickson, supra note 211, at 100 (outlining the pre-contract services and 
why the contract failed). 
 267.  ROUSE, supra note 158, at 207. 
 268.  See James E. Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power Industry: The Impact of 
Antitrust Policy, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 64, n.192 (1972) (stating that coordination between power 
plants can allow them to meet the needed economies of scale) (quoting Commonwealth Edison 
Co., 36 F.P.C. 927 (1967), aff’d sub nom.  Utility Users League v. FPC, 394 F.2d 16 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 953 (1969)). 
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be long enough to encourage management commitment and 
continuity, but short enough to provide the incentives associated with 
the re-tendering of the contract.269 
Effective government oversight of the concession contract 
process also requires performance reviews at regular intervals during 
the contract term.270 Underperformance, measured by a failure to 
achieve regulator-established benchmarks, would result in penalties 
and possible rescission.271 This approach facilitates public-private 
coordination, contract compliance, and regulatory oversight, and is 
similar to the approach taken in some regimes for the concession of 
onshore and offshore development of state-owned oil and gas 
rights.272 The concession contract must also recognize the role of an 
independent agency for environmental protection.273 This 
independence places environmental protection and resource 
sustainability on equal footing with effective pricing, and avoids 
sacrificing sustainability and ecological health in the name of financial 
viability alone. While the aim of the positive right to public utility is 
inherently anthropocentric, if it is excessively so, the aim of that right 
to achieve inter-generational equity will ultimately be frustrated by 
unsustainable practices.274 
Effective government oversight of the concession contract must 
be coupled with transparency in how the agreement with utility 
companies is reached and administered.275 Importantly, the concession 
must be made through a transparent competitive bidding process.276 
The power of competition to achieve efficient pricing cannot be 
ignored even in the case of natural monopolies. Competitive bidding 
processes avoid corruption and facilitate affordable rates by awarding 
concession contracts to the party best able to achieve the objectives of 
a positive right to public utilities at the lowest cost.277 
 
 269.  ROUSE, supra note 158, at 207. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Id.; see also Gail Osherenko, New Discourses on Ocean Governance: Understanding 
Property Rights and the Public Trust, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 317, 379 (2006) (“The 
government should craft contracts . . . with care to allow for periodic performance review . . . .”). 
 272.  See Osherenko, supra note 271, at 362. 
 273.  See id., at n.319. 
 274.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2235. 
 275.  Id. at 2248. 
 276.  See John Ziegler, The Dangers of Municipal Concession Contracts: A New Vehicle to 
Improve Accountability and Transparency, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 571, 581 (2011) (stating that 
Chicago needs to have competition and transparency in its concession contracts). 
 277.  See id. (stating the competitive bidding requirements will ensure Chicago will obtain 
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In addition to a transparent competitive bidding process, the 
contract itself must facilitate transparency by setting forth clear 
objectives and information sharing requirements.278 Information 
sharing would include participation by potential bidders in the 
formulation of specifications for the system or improvements.279 The 
role of information sharing in particular is an effective bulwark 
against corruption in concession contracting.280 The terms of the 
contract should also specify the performance benchmarks against 
which the utility company will be judged in regular performance 
reviews. Transparency is the best safeguard against abuses that would 
undermine a positive right to public utilities.281 
The concession contracting process must also be perceived as 
legitimate in order to facilitate a positive right to public utilities.282 
The concession contract should therefore require a participatory 
stakeholder process and consumer consultation during the term of the 
contract to ensure successful management and acceptance of the 
pricing mechanism.283 And it is through community engagement that 
legitimacy, sustainability, and racial and gender equality in public 
utilities are achieved.284 
Of course, there is no reason a concession contract should be 
necessary in all instances. Many arguments against full cost recovery 
and cost-internalization policies are based on concerns about the risks 
associated with privatization of public infrastructure.285 Concerns over 
cost recovery, pricing, and capital investment in infrastructure are 
often conflated with advocacy for infrastructure privatization,286 a 
global trend that has created challenges in many nations.287 
 
the most cost-effective contract). 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  See generally STEVEN KELMAN, PROCUREMENT AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 90–95 
(1990) (arguing for greater information sharing between private concessionaires and the state). 
 280.  Courtney Hostetler, Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corporate Corruption on 
World Bank-Funded Infrastructure Projects, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 231, 271 (2011). 
 281.  See Nicholas Miranda, Concession Agreements: From Private Contract to Public Policy, 
117 YALE L.J. 510, 521–22 (2007) (stating the creation and implementation of concession 
agreements lack transparency). 
 282.  See id. at 523 (stating that “without accountability” the public is left powerless) . 
 283.  ROUSE, supra note 158, at 207. 
 284.  Okezie Chukwumerije, Peer Review and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa, 
32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 49, 95–97 (2006). 
 285.  New Right in Water, supra note 4, at 2229–30. 
 286.  Id. at 2230. 
 287.  See Arnold, supra note 155, at 796, 798 (stating that the privatization of water supplies 
and infrastructures is a global trend that is appearing prominently in developing countries, but 
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Privatization is advocated on the one hand as a way of facilitating 
access to capital and technical expertise, promoting efficiency, 
reducing costs through competitive bidding, expanding access, and 
improving quality.288 On the other hand, some argue that privatization 
is a dereliction of the government’s public trust in a shared common 
resource and unduly burdens the poor as utility rates are raised to 
ensure debts are repaid and profits secured.289 Although the merits of 
privatization are beyond the scope of this Article, it is sufficient to 
note here that cost recovery is not synonymous with privatization.290 
Furthermore, as demonstrated in the Cochabamba example, 
corruption and a lack of transparency and public participation can 
occur with or without a positive right to public utilities.291 Any 
conception of a right to public utilities, therefore, should include 
rights associated with stakeholder involvement and transparency in 
the development of water, energy or sanitation policy, whether 
through concession contracts to private utility companies or in 
alternative public management or public-private partnerships in the 
management of utility infrastructure. 
Among the range of options, concession contracts are often an 
important part of attracting investment and expertise into developing 
countries in the greatest need of upgrading their public utilities 
infrastructure.292 As capital investments are made, and as citizens 
develop expertise, the concession contract approach can help a state 
to transition away from private ownership of public utility 
 
has led to intense conflicts over a variety of issues and faces public opposition in places such as 
Bolivia); John Briscoe, The Changing Face of Water Infrastructure Financing in Developing 
Countries, 15 WATER RESOURCES DEV. 301, 302 (1999) (noting that there is a global trend of 
an increase in private investment in developing countries’ infrastructures). 
 288.  See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 105, at 700 (“Some see [private sector] 
involvement as an efficient way of tapping into capital and technical expertise, thereby 
achieving both access and conservation goals, increasing the network of official water service 
provision, and increasing the quality and efficiency of that service.”). 
 289.  See id. at 700–01 (“Others see private sector involvement as a violation of the right of 
people to a shared, common resource, and as further alienating poor communities by depriving 
those without means of the ability to pay for necessary water resources.”). 
 290.  See id. at 701 (noting that the South African Constitution allows for the payment of 
water services but does not allow for the denial of basic water access to those that cannot pay, 
placing a financing or political burden on the government). Corporatized publicly-owned 
utilities, effective and transparent regulatory oversight, and public-private partnerships have the 
potential to achieve many of the benefits of privatization, including effective pricing and 
affordable service to poor communities. See generally ROUSE, supra note 158. 
 291.  Budds & McGranahan, supra note 249, at 108. 
 292.  See Ziegler, supra note 276, at 575–77 (stating that concession contracts are able to 
deliver to the public more effectively and at a lower cost than public partners). 
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infrastructure toward true public-private partnerships and public 
ownership of infrastructure.293 Many concession contracts are 
specifically designed for short-term transitions, including Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts, where the utility designs, builds, 
and operates the public utility for a time until it has earned an agreed 
upon return on its investment, after which ownership is transferred to 
the public.294 In these types of public-private partnerships, cost 
recovery, sustainability, and affordability remain the aims of a 
positive right to public utilities while the privatization of 
infrastructure and resources is avoided.295 These aims can be achieved 
when the positive right is effectively enforceable by a specialized 
court, when tariffs allow for full cost recovery, cost-internalization 
encourages conservation, directed subsidies ensure service for all, and 
when there is a transparent and legitimate partnership between the 
state and any private entity engaged in public utilities services. 
CONCLUSION 
So far, obtaining positive rights to public utilities has largely 
failed to achieve the aim of greater access to water, energy, and 
sanitation. However, the positive right to public utilities is still in its 
infancy as a policy tool. The human rights to water and sanitation 
have grown in acceptance in both international law and in domestic 
constitutions, though neither has been widely adopted or enforced 
thus far. A human right to energy, on the other hand, remains largely 
theoretical. The human right to energy has perhaps not risen along 
with the others in part because energy has not been traditionally 
perceived as essential to human welfare as water and sanitation. 
However, energy is diverging from water and sanitation as its 
characteristics become less and less those of a public utility. The 
increasing use of distributed energy through solar and wind projects 
 
 293.  See generally Sepp I, Hukka & Katko, Public-Private Partnerships in Water and 
Sewerage Services: Privatization for Profit or Improvement of Service and Performance, 6 PUB. 
WORKS MGMT. & POL’Y 45 (2001). 
 294.  See generally Thomas P. Hanley, Jr., The BOT Circular: An Evaluation of the New 
Regulatory Framework Governing Privately-Financed Infrastructure Projects in the People’s 
Republic of China, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 59 (1999) (describing the use of BOT contracts in 
China). Many countries transition from pure concession contracts to agreements where private 
parties are contractors, and the state owns the infrastructure). See, e.g., Bryan W. Blades, 
Production, Politics, and Pre-Salt: Transitioning to a PSC Regime in Brazil, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS & 
ENERGY L. 31, 34–35 (2012). 
 295.  See Hanley, supra, note 294, at 72–73 (stating that the gains of privatization are 
realized while the government still maintains long-term control). 
Larson-Macro (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016  5:00 PM 
50 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXVI:1 
allows for greater competition and lower initial capital costs. Retail-
level competition in the energy sector, combined with efforts to 
deregulate the energy industry, may change the energy sector in ways 
relevant to the viability of a positive right. Energy would cease to be 
an effective natural monopoly, and the role of a positive rights 
approach to energy could come to resemble education and health 
care more than water. More research is needed on the impact of 
renewable, distributed energy upon the viability of a positive right to 
public utilities. 
Furthermore, additional research is required to understand 
where the characteristics of public utilities make a positive right more 
difficult, and when those characteristics might facilitate a positive 
right. Where the marginal cost of service is low in an existing system, 
it may be easier to recover costs at low rates, thus making a positive 
right easier to achieve. The characteristics of public utilities may thus 
pose a threat mainly to new systems in urban areas of the developing 
world. A comparative analysis of existing positive rights to water and 
sanitation in different areas may reveal when the characteristics of 
public utilities are assets in the implementation of positive rights and 
when they are liabilities. 
The problems of corruption, unsustainable practices, and lack of 
enforcement are likely not limited to positive rights to public utilities. 
When implementing human rights to food, education, or health care, 
similar challenges are likely to arise and will require careful 
implementation adapted to the unique characteristics of the good or 
service guaranteed by the right. A positive right to education, for 
example, may require adaptive implementation similar to a positive 
right to public utilities in order to achieve transparency due to the 
role of state-funded or state-financed education. But the positive right 
to education may not require cost internalization adaptations such as 
those proposed for public utilities because there is less concern for 
sustainability. Each positive right must be adapted to its own unique 
policy and regulatory environment in order to achieve the aims of 
sustainability, transparency and enforceability. Without those aims, 
and without such adaptation, the right will not survive. More research 
will be needed to determine what unique adaptations are required of 
other positive rights like food, education, or health care. 
It is understandable that policy entrepreneurs seek to prioritize 
essential goods and services like health care, education, food, water, 
and sanitation through the enactment of positive rights. Codifying 
such aspirations as human rights has expressive value, even when 
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those rights are effectively unenforceable. But the implementation of 
a human right to each must be adapted to achieve an enforceable 
right implemented sustainably and with transparency. Too often, 
vague formulations of human rights lead to corruption and 
unsustainable practices. To avoid this outcome, all human rights 
should be implemented with an eye toward what makes the 
guaranteed good or services unique, with the aim of achieving 
enforceability, transparency, and sustainability. 
 
